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This dissertation employs two research methods – in-depth interviews and an 
experiment – to explore seller decisions to accept or reject business from a customer.  In-
depth interviews were conducted to identify the quantitative and subjective factors that 
influence customer selection decisions in retail bank lending.  Among the factors 
identified to influence loan officer decisions to approve or decline a loan are customer 
quantitative merit, customer reputation, and the decision maker’s need for discretion.  
These factors are proposed to comprise a three-way interaction that explains the 
acceptance or rejection of a customer’s business (i.e., customer selection likelihood).  The 
three-way interaction hypothesis is tested using an experimental scenario in a commercial 
lending context.  The experimental scenario was administered to commercial loan 
officers.  A valid and reliable scale for the need for discretion was also developed based 
on the literature and the results from the interviews.  To the author’s knowledge, the 
present study is the first to investigate at the individual decision-making level, factors 
influencing whether to accept or reject a customer’s business.  The results are discussed 
in terms of their generality to other marketing settings in which the seller decides whether 
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How to reduce the likelihood of acquiring an unprofitable customer is an 
important issue for marketing managers.  Just as it is vital for firms to identify their best 
customers and to find new profitable customers, it is equally important to pinpoint bad 
customers and to avoid attracting future customers that will be liabilities on a firm’s 
balance sheet (Cao and Gruca 2005; Ittner and Larcker 1998; Venkatesan and Kumar 
2004).  Acquiring the wrong customers is a predicament referred to as adverse selection 
(Cao and Gruca 2005).  Once thought to be constrained to the marketing of loans and 
insurance, adverse selection is an issue that all companies confront (Reichheld and 
Schefter 2000; Reichheld 1996).   
Adverse selection outcomes can occur with new customers or with existing 
customers when cross-selling products (Cao and Gruca 2005).  To reduce its occurrence, 
firms employ a screening process to “weed out” bad customers.  For example in banking, 
screening processes to evaluate customer loan requests vary in the information utilized 
and the use of human discretion.  First, banks might evaluate customer loan requests 
using credit scoring systems that leave little if any discretion to human judgment.  
Alternatively, banks might employ a judgmental credit scoring system that combines an 
evaluation of the customer’s quantitative information (e.g., credit score) with the loan 
officer’s decision-making discretion.  The present research adopts a judgmental credit 
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scoring system to explore individual decision-making processes in screening customers 
and making customer selection decisions.       
Previous research exploring the individual’s role in customer selection found that 
salespeople who took a systematic approach to qualify and acquire customers performed 
better than their counterparts (Szymanski and Churchill 1990).  Acquiring the “right” 
customers leads to increased firm performance (Leigh and Tanner 2004; Reinartz, Krafft, 
and Hoyer 2004).  Taken together, these findings indicate that individual employees who 
exhibit job behaviors focused on proactively managing customer relationships can 
contribute to the overall valuation of the firm (Gupta, Lehmann, and Stuart 2004).  More 
commonly, discussion of measures to exercise caution in selecting customers has been 
reserved for markets of risk products, or when the purchase of the product imposes more 
risks on the seller than on the buyer (Cao and Gruca 2005).  Recent application of 
modern portfolio theory suggests that firms should manage their customer portfolio as 
they do an investment portfolio, assessing the risks of current and prospective customers 
before investing resources into these relationships (Ryals 2003).  It is when the 
“relationship risks” borne by the seller exceed those of the buyer that the characteristics 
of buyer-seller exchange can be examined. 
 In the marketplace there are various exchange conditions between buyers and 
sellers (Houston and Gassenheimer 1987).  Typically in market exchanges, both the 
buyer and the seller evaluate the exchange partner as well as the terms and conditions of 
the exchange.  Based on these buyer-seller evaluation judgments, two perspectives of the 
market exchange emerge.  The first perspective, referred to as a buyer-choice market 
exchange, occurs when the seller desires to make a sale and the risks of exchange are 
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greater for the buyer than for the seller.  When the conditions of the exchange are buyer-
choice, the buyer must decide whether or not to complete the transaction with the seller 
based on an evaluation of the terms offered and other product alternative choices.  This 
perspective of buyer-choice market exchanges has received the most attention in the 
marketing literature.  A second perspective, however, can explain a number of other 
market exchanges.  This perspective, referred to here as a seller-choice market exchange, 
occurs when the buyer desires to buy from a particular seller and the risks of exchange 
are greater for the seller than for the buyer.  When the conditions of an exchange are 
“seller-choice,” the seller evaluates the buyer and then decides whether to accept or reject 
the buyer’s business.   
Figure 1-1 illustrates these two different exchange perspectives.  There are a 
number of examples of market exchanges where, because of the imposed risks on the 
seller, the seller decides whether the customer receives the product.  For example, 
services such as banking, insurance, real estate, education, healthcare, and private clubs 
or fraternities all involve the seller forming an evaluation about the buyer and then 
deciding whether to accept business from the buyer and, if so, under what terms and 
conditions.  The present research explores factors impacting such seller decisions. 
While various literature streams acknowledge the importance of screening 
customers, previous work has not yet explored the individual and situational factors that 
influence specific seller decisions about whether to accept or reject business from a 
customer.  For example, the industrial marketing and supply chain literature suggests 
criteria for evaluating suppliers and channel members.  This literature, however, does not 





EVALUATION OF THE SELLER 
(i.e., Do I buy from this seller?)
Buyer
SELLING FOCUS
(i.e., I want to sell to this buyer.)
Seller
BUYING FOCUS
(i.e., I want to buy from this seller.)
EVALUATION OF THE BUYER
(i.e., Do I sell to this buyer?)
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partners (Wathne and Heide 2004).  Also, recent research that has concentrated on 
measuring customer profitability (e.g., customer lifetime value) does account for the 
present and future value of the customer (Rust et al. 2004; Venkatesan and Kumar 2004) 
and implies that the selling firm should safeguard resource investments in its customer 
base by first determining the quantitative and subjective value of each customer.  To the 
author’s knowledge, work in this area has not investigated the factors that influence the 
decision-making process of determining the value of a specific customer and whether the 
business from the customer should be accepted or rejected.  Furthermore, the personal 
selling and sales management literature suggests that salespeople with rigorous standards 
in qualifying customer prospects experience increased sales performance (Szymanski and 
Churchill 1990).  At the conclusion of their work however, Szymanski and Churchill 
issued a call for future research into how different factors influence customer-selection 
decisions.  This research represents a response to this call. 
 
Research Questions and Design 
 
This dissertation employs two methods – in-depth interviews and an experiment – 
to explore seller decisions to accept or reject business from a customer in addressing four 
research questions. 
1. What quantitative and subjective factors influence customer selection 
decisions in the bank lending industry? 
 
2. What influence do loan officers have on customer-selection judgments? 
 
3. What are the joint effects of customer quantitative merit, customer reputation, 




4. What are the intervening effects of customer risk assessment, attitude toward 
the customer, and perceived value of the customer on customer selection 
likelihood? 
 
A qualitative study (i.e., Study 1) was employed to answer the first two research 
questions.  This study aimed at exploring the quantitative and subjective factors that 
influence customer selection decisions and the role of the loan officer in making these 
decisions.  The context of the study was retail bank lending.  The format consisted of 
sixteen in-depth interviews with bank executives and loan officers and five additional 
interviews with state and federal bank examiners and regulators.  Based on the results of 
these interviews, the researcher developed the remaining two research questions. 
Research questions three and four investigate the factors that influence individual 
decisions whether to accept or reject a customer’s request for a product.  Among the 
factors believed to influence seller decisions to accept or reject a customer’s business are 
customer quantitative merit, customer reputation, and the decision-maker’s need for 
discretion.  These factors are proposed to comprise a three-way interaction that explains 
the acceptance or rejection of business from a new or existing customer (i.e., customer 
selection likelihood).  The three-way interaction hypothesis is tested using an 
experimental case scenario design which involved embedding a fictitious customer 
portfolio in a survey.  In addition, exploratory relationships are tested among three 
process variables believed to influence the decision.  The experimental scenario was 
piloted with commercial loan officers and with MBA/undergraduate students and then 
administered to commercial loan officers across various types and sizes of banks in five 
U.S. states.  A valid and reliable scale for need for discretion was also developed based 
on the literature and the results from the interviews. 
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Results and Contributions 
 
The findings of in-depth interviews with bank executives, bank loan officers, and 
bank examiners revealed insights into factors that influence the customer selection 
decision process.  First, individual bank loan officers have the greatest influence on 
customer selection decisions when the customer’s request is for commercial lending 
products.  This influence is most direct when the bank loan officer is deciding on a small 
commercial loan that falls within a prescribed lending limit or loan authority.  Second, 
bank officers exhibit different behaviors when evaluating the information of prospective 
borrowers because of an individual’s chronic need for discretion, or the propensity to 
seek autonomy from organizational norms when making decisions.  Third, various types 
of information are used to evaluate and decide the outcome of a customer loan request.  
The types of information found to be most important when evaluating a small business 
loan request were information about the borrower’s quantitative situation and information 
about the borrower’s character or reputation.  Finally, economic market conditions and 
the presence of federal and state regulations influence customer selection practices in 
banking.  The findings from the interviews were critical in the design of the experimental 
model, including the measurement and manipulation of the model constructs.  Based on a 
cue diagnosticity perspective, hypotheses were proposed and tested using an 
experimental case scenario design. 
 Based on a sample of 262 commercial loan officers, support was found for a 
three-way interaction of customer quantitative merit, customer reputation, and the 
decision-maker’s need for discretion.  The pattern of the interaction, however, did not 
follow the logic and argument of a cue diagnosticity perspective.  The results, however, 
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do support the prediction that individuals with a high chronic need for discretion are 
influenced by customer reputation information, whereas individuals with a low need for 
discretion are not influenced by reputation, but instead by the borrower’s credit score.  
Contrary to the hypothesis, these results were limited to situations in which the loan 
officer evaluated customers with a more favorable credit score.  Exploratory analyses 
were also conducted and main effect relationships on customer selection likelihood were 
found for customer risk assessment, attitude toward the customer, and the perceived value 
of the customer. 
 Based on these results, this work contributes to the marketing literature in three 
ways.  First, this research adopts a seller-choice process (versus a buyer-choice process) 
perspective to explore the factors influencing a decision whether to accept a customer’s 
business request.  Second, this research identifies and develops a scale for the 
individual’s chronic need for discretion to explain behavioral tendencies in how customer 
information is evaluated and whether a customer’s request is approved.  Third, this 
research explores a model of the customer selection process that accounts for the effects 
of customer risk assessment, attitude toward the customer, and perceived value of the 
customer on customer selection likelihood.  
 
Organization of the Dissertation 
 
This dissertation contains six chapters.  Chapter II provides a broad conceptual 
development discussion that describes the unique perspective of seller decisions in 
customer selection.  Also included in this chapter is a review of the relevant literature, 
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including the sales and sales management, business-to-business marketing, supply chain 
management, customer profitability, and “firing” the customer literature.   
Chapter III presents the qualitative in-depth interviews with bank executives, 
bank loan officers, and state/federal regulators.  The results of these interviews are 
presented thematically around each of the study’s research questions.  
Chapter IV describes the experimental study, introduces a proposed model of 
individual and situational factors believed to influence customer selection decisions.  A 
conceptual framework is presented which describes the theoretical foundation for the 
model.  Each of the model’s constructs are defined and the formal hypothesis is 
presented.  The experimental methodology is outlined, including the scale development 
of the decision-maker’s need for discretion, the development and pilot testing of the 
scenario, the research design, and the analytical techniques used in testing the hypothesis. 
The results and findings from this study are discussed based on the study’s research 
questions. 
Chapter V includes a general discussion of the results and the managerial and 







This chapter provides an overview of the nature of customer selection in 
marketplace exchanges and reviews the literature streams that are the foundation for the 
experimental study.  This review is organized into three sections.  First, a description of 
the different classes of marketplace exchanges is presented to describe the unique 
perspective of seller-choice decision processes.  Second, examples of various contexts 
surrounding the class of exchanges involving seller decisions to accept or reject a 





There are various classes of exchange in the marketplace.  Buyers and sellers 
evaluate and make decisions regarding with whom to transact business.  Buyer and seller 
decisions regarding the terms and conditions of an exchange (i.e., whether to buy or to 
sell) reflect the need-satisfying purpose of exchange (Houston and Gassenheimer 1987).  
For example, buyers seek to obtain goods and services to satisfy their needs.  Likewise, 
sellers choose to which buyers and sellers to provide their goods and services.  Figure 2-1 
depicts four marketplace situations involving buyer-seller exchange dyads.  First, in one 
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class of exchange, buyers decide to which potential buyers they will refer or recommend 
goods and services.  The figure refers to this class of exchange as Quadrant I (Should I  
refer this friend/associate?).  Examples of buyers referring other buyers to satisfy their 
mutual needs of obtaining goods and services are buyer-hosted parties (e.g., Tupperware 
and Pampered Chef) and multi-level marketing schemes (e.g., Amway).  In these 
examples, the buyers consider which friends to invite to a product party or which 
associates to introduce to a multi-level marketing program.   
Second, arguably the most frequent class of exchange involves buyers choosing a 
seller to patronize.  In Figure 2-1, this class of exchange is shown in Quadrant II (i.e., 
Which seller should I buy from?).  Examples of Quadrant II exchanges span many 
consumer goods and services contexts (e.g., grocery stores, restaurants, airlines).   
There are also seller-seller exchanges, in which, sellers decide from which 
seller/supplier to obtain needed materials and services in order to provide their products 
and services.  Quadrant III in Figure 2-1 refers to this class of exchange (i.e., Which 
supplier should I use?).  Examples of this class of exchange include the decision by Dell, 
the computer hardware company, to purchase microprocessors from Intel, or a hospital’s 
decision to purchase materials from specific medical supply companies.  
Because of the increasing awareness of the risks of adverse selection, attention 
focus has been directed to how sellers decide from which customers to accept business.  
This class of exchange is depicted in Figure 2-1 as Quadrant IV (i.e., Should I sell to this 
customer?).  The present work focuses on this class of market exchange.  Example 
contexts where the seller makes decisions regarding whether to sell to the customer 
include banking, real estate, insurance, healthcare, legal services, education, and private 
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clubs/affiliations.  While commercial retail bank lending was chosen as the primary 
context for this type of exchange in this study, the following examples are taken from real 
estate, education, and consumer financial services.  The next section elaborates on the 
contexts in which a seller makes a decision regarding whether to accept the buyer’s 
exchange request.  
Figure 2-1 
 





Real estate, consumer financial services, and education are contexts where the 
seller decides whether to extend an offer or opportunity to exchange with a buyer.  In 
these and other contexts although the buyer may be the party that ultimately decides 
whether to accept the terms of the exchange the seller must first deem the buyer 
acceptable; only then will the seller extend an offer describing the terms and/or 
conditions of the exchange agreement. 
In real estate the seller, both as a broker/agent and as the real-estate property 
owner, decides whether, and if so how, a buyer is serviced.  Real estate agents/brokers 
may determine how time, effort, and promotional resources are allocated among their 
clientele.  Such decisions are influenced by the perceived profitability of the customer 
based upon the customer’s credit worthiness, purchase/sales price, and time urgency.  
The depth of relationship between an agent and a client may contribute to how time, 
effort, and financial resources are allocated.  For example, an agent may be determined to 
service one customer more thoroughly than another because of personal or business 
relationship ties.  Similar situation occurs when a property owner evaluates multiple 
buyers before selling a piece of property.  Besides considering the offered purchase price, 
a seller may consider the buyer’s credit worthiness, the buyer’s intentions and interest in 
the property, the contract time frame, and the buyer’s reputation. 
Another context where buyers must meet certain qualifications is that of retail and 
wholesale consumer financial products.  In these industries, a strong emphasis is placed 
on maintaining personalized information for each current and potential customer in order 
to screen and select customers (Wyner 2000).  It is common practice for financial service 
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companies to extend offers to customer segments who meet demographic, behavioral, 
and psychographic criteria and who also are likely to respond and be approved to receive 
the offer (Cao and Gruca 2005).  For example, a credit card offer may be targeted to 
customers who use credit frequently of credit usage behavior or who are believed to have 
a need for a new credit card (i.e., available share of wallet).  Then, based on the 
customer’s credit application, the customer is declined, or is granted specific interest 
rates, and annual fees and assigned to a specific level in a rewards programs.  Because of 
recent developments in credit scoring technology and systems, these decisions are 
frequently made automatically and the role of individual employee discretion has 
diminished.  In the area of insurance, however, the discretion of the agent plays an 
important role in qualifying new policies or re-pricing existing polices.  A recent study 
reported that 92% of the largest personal automobile insurers in the U.S. use credit scores 
to qualify customers for automobile insurance; however, only 50% use insurance scores 
for both underwriting and pricing (Bray 2001).  This study’s findings suggest that while 
automobile and home insurers are increasingly using credit scores to assess the risk of 
each customer as a basis for selection customers, decision-makers also weigh other 
factors, including the applicant’s driving history, previous claims, amount of outstanding 
debt, and length of time with the insurance company.   
A third context where seller-choice exchange occurs is in education, where, at all 
levels, “buyers” (i.e., students and their families), may apply for admission into an 
educational institution or program.  Admission decisions ultimately are based on a 
number of factors including for example, academic achievement, extra-curricular 
activities, relationship ties to the institution (e.g., alumni), and social standing in the 
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community.  In fact, admission practices have been highly controversial.  Recently the 
U.S. Supreme Court heard two cases involving the practice of weighing minority 
applicants more favorably in the undergraduate and law school admissions at the 
University of Michigan.  Arguments both in support of and in opposition to admission 
practices that evaluate “soft” measures of the predicted success and contribution of the 
applicant in academic programs were presented (McFeatters 2003).  President George W. 
Bush asked the federal government to file a friend-of-the court brief against the 
University of Michigan to iterate that giving preferential treatment to African American, 
Hispanic, and Native American applicants was unfair.  Opponents of preferential 
treatment claimed that the preferential scoring system increased the odds of a minority 
applicant’s being accepted at Michigan to be 234 times greater than for non-minority 
applicants with the same grades and test scores (McFeatters 2003).  Parties in support of 
the University of Michigan argued that a point system for minorities is no different from 
the widespread practice of giving special consideration to the children of alumni, large 
donors, public officials, and faculty and staff, and to athletes from underrepresented parts 
of a state (McFeatters 2003).  The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of the use of 
minority class when evaluating law school applicants, but ruled against the same practice 
for undergraduate admissions (National Public Radio 2003).   
In a formal statement regarding these cases, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor referred 
to admission practices which use “soft” variables such as the enthusiasm of an 
applicant’s recommenders, the quality of an applicant’s undergraduate institution, 
the quality of the applicant’s essay, and the areas and difficulty of undergraduate 
course selection (Supreme Court of the United States 2003: 1-2).  Similar to the use 
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of “soft” measures in evaluating applicants, the present work addresses the impact of 




Customer screening and selection practices are critical to marketing practice.  
Various literature streams directly or indirectly recognize the importance of customer 
selection.  For example, the personal selling and sales management literature refers to 
customer prospecting as the “lifeblood of selling” because of its importance in sustaining 
firm profitability (Futrell 2004).  The business-to-business marketing literature also 
recognizes the importance of account and channel member selection and has proposed a 
systematic selection process for doing so (Sarkis and Talluri 2002; Gadde and Håkansson 
2001).  Also, recent emphasis on assessing the value or profitability of the customer 
demonstrates the importance of customer evaluation and selection (Ryals 2003).  This 
importance is exemplified through marketing metrics such as customer equity (CE) and 
customer lifetime value (CLV).  Often indirectly stated, these metrics place significant 
importance on customer selection in managing a customer portfolio.  Customer portfolio 
management (CPM), which has adopted a perspective similar to earlier work in product 
or investment portfolio management (i.e., Boston Consulting Group), focuses on 
assessing the risk of each customer in order to increase the future value of the firm’s 
customers (Ryals 2003).  Another small but growing body of literature coinciding with 
research on customer profitability is what to do with customers that are not profitable 
(i.e., firing the customer) (Zeithaml and Bitner 2003).  Each of these literature streams 
will now be reviewed.   
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Personal Selling and Sales Management 
 
Prospecting is the first step in the traditional sales process (Futrell 2004).  Most 
descriptions of the sales process propose that qualifying the lead or customer is the initial 
step in prospecting and lead management.  Primarily serving as pedagogical frameworks, 
various descriptive models have been proposed to qualify and select customers (Futrell 
2004; Jones, Stevens, and Chonko 2005).  The most prevalent of these models is the 
M.A.D. model, which refers to a three-step qualification process of determining a 
prospect’s money to buy, authority to buy, and desire to buy.  In another pedagogical 
model, Ingram et al. (2006) propose that a qualified prospect is one that (1) can benefit 
from the sales offering, (2) has the financial wherewithal to make the purchase, (3) plays 
an important role in the purchase decision process, (4) is eligible to buy based on a fit 
within the selling strategy (i.e., fits the profile of the desired customer), (5) is reasonably 
accessible and willing to consider the sales offering, and finally (6) can be added to the 
customer base at an acceptable level of profitability to allow a mutually beneficial 
relationship between buyer and seller.  Apart from these descriptive approaches, 
empirical work on customer selection models has surprisingly only recently been of 
interest to the marketing researcher.  
One notable effort is the work of Szymanski and Churchill (1990), which took a 
“cognitive sales” perspective to better understand the factors influencing salesperson 
performance.  This work focused on how salespeople use memory-triggered cues to 
classify and categorize potential customers.  Szymanski and Churchill’s work represents 
the first research to investigate the factors that influence client prospecting in a personal 
selling context.  Szymanski and Churchill chose to explore the process of client 
18
evaluation in the financial service industry because of this industry’s reliance on prospect 
qualification and because of the disparity in selling performance across financial service 
sales agents.  Based on prior consumer research in the area of memory (e.g., Alba and 
Hutchinson 1987), Szymanski and Churchill (1990) used a cue elicitation procedure to 
identify six independent variables or cue values (e.g., age range, number of children, 
degree of commitment to improve financial position, number of financial goals, income, 
and marital status).  Each cue had a corresponding importance weight, and each 
respondent described these factors across categories of prospect type (e.g., general 
prospect, poor prospect, moderate prospect, good prospect, and ideal prospect).  For their 
analysis, an objective measure of salesperson performance (e.g., average number of plans 
sold per quarter) was regressed on the cue values and cue weight across each prospect 
category type.  
Szymanski and Churchill (1990) found that effective and ineffective salespeople 
differ in the importance weights they assign evaluation cues, as well as on the cutoff 
threshold values they establish for these cues.  They found that, although the properties of 
the cues differ for good and poor performers, the quantity of cues do not.  Their rationale 
for this finding was that all salespeople, regardless of their performance level, readily 
learn the basic steps of prospecting.  These results show that good performers give less 
weight to the number of financial goals, age, and number of children in describing 
prospects.  In terms of the cutoff points imposed on cues, they found that higher income 
standards, a higher number of goals, a narrower age range, and fewer children were the 
threshold trends related to salesperson success.  Based on these findings, Szymanski and 
Churchill (1990) concluded that salespeople who apply stiffer standards in classifying 
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customers have higher sales performance.  Furthermore, they proposed that future 
research look not only at the influence of cues on prospect classification, but also at how 




Exchange partner evaluation and selection are important concepts in business-to-
business marketing management (Hutt and Speh 2001; Hutt, Johnston, and Ronchetto 
1985).  For example, research on account selection and management suggests that unless 
firms carefully identify key customer accounts, firms risk over-serving unprofitable 
accounts and wasting resources (Cespedes 1995).  Therefore, the selling firm must 
determine how each new customer defines “value” prior to formally acquiring the 
customer.  Then, the selling firm can decide if it can meet and leverage the “value” 
demands of the new customer while still meeting the demands of other customers 
(Cespedes 1995).  
 Related to account selection is work in the channels literature on the selection of 
channel members, especially supplier selection.  According to Wathne and Heide (2004), 
the level of governance a firm has with its suppliers is facilitated in part by the extent to 
which the firm qualifies its suppliers.  The governance provided through a formal 
qualification process protects the firm from opportunistic behavior by its partners (Stump 
and Heide 1996).  Therefore, this research provides theoretical reasoning for evaluating 
and predicting systematically which prospective partners might cause governance issues 
for the firm.   
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An important contribution of the channels literature is the various evaluative 
criteria to aid in the selection of channel partners.  Sarkis and Talluri (2002), taking a 
purchasing perspective, look at how the business “customer” selects a “supplier.”  Sarkis 
and Talluri suggest that the following factors should be considered when selecting a 
supplier: strategic performance factors (e.g., cost, quality, time, and flexibility), 
organizational factors (e.g., trust, management, culture), technological factors (e.g., 
compatibility, manufacturing, and design capability), and relationship factors (e.g., depth, 
communication openness, and reputation integrity).  Gadde and Håkansson (2001) also 
include financial strength as an important factor in selecting a channel partner.  
Theoretically the work of Tarkis and Talluri, and Gadde and Håkansson is important to 
the present research because their work proposes a variety of “hard” (e.g., delivery speed) 
and “soft” (e.g., reputation) criteria.   
 In addition to helping a firm defend against opportunistic behavior, a systematic 
selection process provides an opportunity for the relationship partners to become 
socialized with one another’s goals and values (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987; Ouchi 1979; 
Wathne and Heide 2004).  When relationship partners (manufacturer-customer) share 
similar goals and values, a relational bond is created that reduces the occurrence of 
relationship dissolution.  Because it decreases the likelihood of opportunism and 
promotes on-going relationships, firms need to engage in systematic qualification of their 
customers or strategic partners. 
The steep consequences of acquiring poor strategic partners have led Hutt and 
Speh (2001) to propose that the systematic evaluation of partners should be an ongoing 
process.  This process enables the firm to replace poor performers with potentially better 
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ones (Hutt and Speh 2001).  Hutt and Speh suggest that channel member selection should 
be formally included in the processes of channel management instead of being relegated 
to a channel design consideration.  They recommend identifying prospects through 
discussions with company salespeople, and reviewing trade directories and publications 
and then qualifying prospects using firm and industry criteria including market coverage, 
product lines, personnel, growth, and financial standing.  
Partner acquisition in industrial marketing also entails considering independent 
manufacturers’ representatives as an important customer base (Silberman 1995).  When 
regarded as “customers,” independent reps can be valuable channel members and should 
be carefully selected and managed since they are contracted by several companies to 
represent what are often competing product offerings (Hutt and Speh 2001; Silberman 
1995).  It is imperative then for manufacturers to qualify and carefully select the best reps 
in their trade area to represent their products. 
 In summary, the business-to-business marketing literature, including research on 
supply chain management, recognizes the importance of customer/supplier acquisition.  
The primary contribution of this research stream the suggestion that a variety of “hard” 
and “soft” evaluative criteria combine to influence selection decisions.   
 
Value of the Customer 
 
A firm’s relationships with its customers are one of its most important assets 
(Srivastava et al. 1998).  Proactively managing customer profitability increases the 
profitability of the firm as a whole (Ittner and Larcker 1998).  Because of the impact of 
managing customer relationships, it is no surprise that a significant emphasis has been 
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placed on developing marketing metrics to measure customer profitability (Rust et al. 
2004).  Among the metrics receiving the most attention are customer equity (CE) and 
customer lifetime value (CLV) (Rust et al. 2004; Venkatesan and Kumar 2004).  Both CE 
and CLV support the notion that a firm should segment its customer portfolio and 
allocate expenditures for building and maintaining its most valuable customers.  CE 
refers to the sum of the lifetime values of all the firm’s current and future customers 
(Rust et al. 2004).  CLV is the total financial contribution (e.g., revenues less costs) of a 
customer over the lifetime of that customer’s relationship with the firm (Jones, Stevens, 
and Chonko 2005).  Both CE and CLV are proposed as objective measures to help 
marketing professionals justify firm-dedicated marketing expenditures and to target the 
“right” customers.  
However, despite being conceptualized as objective measures, CE and CLV both 
rely on subjective inputs in their calculation.  For example, the measure of CLV includes 
three elements: duration of relationship, revenues, and costs (Ryals 2003).  The duration 
of the customer’s relationship with the firm is forecast by a key informant in the 
organization or is extrapolated from previous experience.  Revenues are actual and 
anticipated sales of the customer.  Because it is a challenge for firms to monitor the 
precise individual costs of servicing each of their customers, the actual costs of servicing 
the customer are difficult to pinpoint.  However, customer service and sales automation 
systems have been effective in tracking one type of cost-- time spent handling and 
resolving customer requests and issues.  Therefore, complicating the operationalization of 
CLV is the informant’s qualitative evaluation of the customer’s anticipated relationship 
duration and the customer’s anticipated sales.   
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The idea of a firm segmenting its customer portfolio stems from the basic concept 
of portfolio analysis used in product and brand management (e.g., Boston Consulting 
Group Matrix).  Ryals (2003) borrows the basic tenets of quantitative portfolio analysis 
(Sharpe 1964) to explore the application of modern portfolio theory (MPT) to customer 
portfolio management (CPM).  Ryals (2003) demonstrates the application of MPT and 
the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) via a case methodology where a collaborative 
research project was undertaken with the customer management team of a leading 
insurance company.  The inclusion of the MPT and the CAPM models into the active 
discussion surrounding customer and firm profitability is noteworthy because both MPT 
and CAPM suggest that CLV and CE may be inadequate measures of the true value of 
the customer because they do not account for the individual risk-level of the customer.  
Ryals (2003) provides examples of consumer mortgages/loans and credit card services as 
“real world” situations where both customer profitability and risk determines how 
customers are managed.  Ryals (2003) proposed two strategic directions for incorporating 
customer risk management into the existing customer relationship management (CRM) 
paradigm.  The first strategic choice is a risk reduction strategy, a “defensive strategy” 
aimed at preventing the loss of existing customer relationships (Johnson and Selnes 
2004).  The second strategic direction, risk-based pricing, is a more “offensive” strategy, 
where a risky customer may have to pay more than a less risky customer.  Using financial 
services as the example, Ryals proposes the alternative strategy of refusing high risk 
customers in certain situation, but cautions that this should be an exception and not the 
rule.  
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Relating customer profitability to customer acquisition, Reinartz, Thomas, and 
Kumar (2005) proposed a process model to balance the costs of acquiring customers with 
the costs of retaining them.  Their model proposes that resources be allocated 
strategically to customer acquisition and customer retention.  They suggest that the 
likelihood of acquiring the customer is a function of firm actions (e.g., expenditures), 
customer actions (e.g., customer-initiated communication) and customer characteristics 
(e.g., industry type, annual revenue, and firm size).  The duration of the relationship or 
the retention of the customer depends on the firm’s investment in communicating with 
the customer.  The work of Reinartz, Thomas, and Kumar is important to the present 
research because it takes a process-perspective in understanding the firm’s acquisition of 
the customer. 
This research stream aimed at assessing the value of customers is crucial to the 
present work because although specific factors have not been identified, this research 
stream suggests that a variety of factors influences the customer screening and selection 
process. 
 
Firing the Customer 
 
The present research focuses on exchanges in which the seller decides whether to 
accept business from a customer.  Another situation in which the seller makes an 
important decision regarding how to manage a customer relationship occurs when a seller 
decides whether to “fire”, or terminate a relationship with, an existing customer 
(Zeithaml and Bitner 2003).  Dwyer, Schurr and Oh (1987) were the first to consider this 
concept in terms of what they called the “dissolution of the relationship.”  Relationship 
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dissolution refers to “the uncoupling of parties from highly evolved relationships” 
(Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987, p. 23).  Seller-initiated dissolution may result because the 
customer is no longer profitable, because the seller is dissatisfied with the customer, or 
because of involuntary switching beyond the control of the customer (e.g., service 
provider or customer relocate) (Hocutt 1999). 
 Firing the customer without generating negative publicity and word-of-mouth 
communication about the seller is a challenge.  Zeithaml and Bitner (2003) suggest that 
one way of eliminating unprofitable customers from a customer portfolio is to increase 
the price or cost of the product or service offering.  A more friendly approach to 
terminating a relationship with a customer is to help the customer find a new supplier or 
service provider that can better meet the customer’s needs.  This strategy might be more 
effective in minimizing negative backlash.  Another strategy is to consult with the 
customer to re-negotiate the customer’s expectations for the product and service, and if 
both parties are not satisfied, both the customer and seller may find an agreeable 
termination to the relationship (Zeithaml and Bitner 2003).    
 The perspective of seller-initiated termination of the relationship is valuable to the 
present research because it suggests that the seller must proactively evaluate a firm’s 
customers throughout the various stages of the relationship.  Also this literature suggests 
alternative resolutions to managing “higher risk” or problem customers: through open-





Based on this review of the literature, it is clear that customer selection practices 
are an important area of research.  While each research stream contributes to this 
research, overall, customer selection is a neglected research area.  For example, while the 
personal selling and sales management literature recognizes the value of qualifying the 
customer prospect (Szymanski and Churchill 1990), besides the work of Syzmanski and 
Churchill, the sales literature does not investigate the factors influencing the process of 
customer selection decisions.  Similarly, the business-to-business and supply chain 
literature only provides examples of the selection criteria used by manufacturers and 
purchasing departments.  In addition, this literature identifies relationship governance, the 
“fit” of the customer, and the socialization of relationship partners as theory rationale to 
argue for a systematic process for partner qualification and selection.  However, it too 
fails to investigate factors influencing the customer selection decision. 
 Also reviewed was literature focused on the value or profitability of the customer.  
Implied in this literature is the need for the firm to manage its customer portfolio and 
assess the risks and the returns of the customer when deciding on which customers to 
invest in.  The metrics proposed to measure customer profitability (e.g., CLV, CE) also 
suggest that the selling firm should make quantitative and subjective judgments regarding 
the value of each specific customer (i.e., CLV) and the overall customer base (i.e., CE).  
However, the factors that influence the quantitative and subjective screening and 
selection decision have not yet been explored.   
Finally, the stream of literature directed at relationship dissolution or “firing” the 
customer suggests there are situations when sellers should terminate relationships with 
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their customers.  Alternatives for firing the customer include modifying the terms and 
conditions of the customer’s relationships.  In sum, this literature provides another 




QUALITATIVE STUDY  
 
The primary aim of this dissertation is to identify the factors that influence the 
individual decision-making process in customer selection.  Because no previous work has 
investigated these factors, a qualitative study was undertaken as a starting point.  This 
chapter delineates the methodology of a qualitative study to answer the following 
research questions. 
1. What quantitative and subjective factors influence customer selection decisions in 
the banking lending industry? 
 
2. What influence do loan officers have on customer selection judgments? 
 
The chapter begins with a brief discussion of the industry setting for this study-- 
bank lending.  After a brief explanation of what made this industry an attractive context 
for this study, the methodology and a discussion of the results of sixteen in-depth 
qualitative interviews are presented.  The results from these qualitative interviews 




The industry setting for this study is bank lending.  The broad scope of bank 
lending allowed the researcher to seek information about customer selection in across 
banking products (e.g., retail consumer, wholesale consumer, retail commercial). 
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Banking was chosen as the context for this study for a number of reasons.  First, banks 
are in a unique position to target and approve loans for customers who meet certain 
qualifying criteria.  Second, for different consumer and commercial credit products, 
banks use different types of information to analyze the customer’s financial strength, 
value, ability to repay.  Cole et al. (2004) found that small banks tend to use more 
subjective data (i.e., “soft” information) to analyze business loans, while larger banks 
base their decisions more on quantitative financial data (i.e., “hard” information).  The 
ability of small banks to use “soft” information enables them to survive doing small 
business lending because they can focus on relationship development and non-
standardized loans better than can larger banks.  DeYoung et al. (2004) described small 
banks as doing non-standardized loans (e.g., small business lending), whereas large banks 
that rely more exclusively on hard information are more fit to do standardized loan 
requests (e.g., credit card loans).  The work of Carter and colleagues supported this 
notion that small banks do in fact perform better than larger banks in small business 
lending (Carter and McNulty 2005; Carter, McNulty, and Verbrugge 2004).  The 
theoretical explanation that Carter and colleagues provided is that small banks are able to 
differentiate themselves because they are best suited to overcome the information 
asymmetry that exists when evaluating soft information.  As a result, small banks are 
better able to meet the needs of their small business customers because they have access 
to better credit information and the organizational structure that allows for greater 
flexibility and discretion in meeting these customers’ needs.  Large banks, however, do 
business with larger firms, which typically interact in more impersonal ways, are less 
exclusive, and maintain shorter tenures with their banks (Carter and McNulty 2005).   
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The third factor in choosing bank lending as the context for this research is that 
banks traditionally have placed importance on the customer’s relationship with the bank.  
Specifically, banks value relationships with customers and target the most valuable 
customer segments with their lending products.  Fourth, changes in regulation and 
advancement in technology in banking have contributed to banks’ taking a more 
aggressive strategy regarding segmenting customers and marketing their products.  These 
changes in regulatory governance over the industry provide the opportunity to compare 
actual lending practices to the normative guidelines prescribed by policy makers and 
bank regulators.  In summary, this industry provides a dynamic context to explore what 




Research Design and Sample 
 
With an interview methodology, the range of perspectives to be examined is an 
important consideration.  A sample with little variation will yield limited range of views, 
raising, concerns regarding the representativeness and generalizability of the data.  
Therefore, the researcher sampled informants from a wide spectrum of banks and from a 
variety of banking positions.  Initially the sampling frame consisted of interviews with 
males in community banks and regional or super-regional banks located in a western U.S. 
state.  This sampling frame was later expanded to include female participants.  Initially, 
phone interviews were conducted with bank executives from eight banks in the western 
U.S. ranging in size from large regional banks to small community banks.  At the 
completion of each of the bank executive interviews, the researcher requested permission, 
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to contact at least one loan officer.  Some bank executives provided information for more 
than one loan officer.  No preference was given for the type of loan officer (e.g., 
consumer/personal, residential mortgage, commercial). Interestingly, the loan officers in 
many of the smaller community banks who participated held an executive title/position 
(e.g., vice president) in addition to their loan officer responsibilities.  The duration of 
each interview was approximately 40 minutes. 
 The ranges of the population of interview participants included the following 
characteristics.  A complete listing of interview participant characteristics is found in 
Table 3-1. 
1. Age – 29 to 66 
2. Gender – male and female 
3. Company Tenure – 1.5 years to 37 years 




Respondent Characteristics - Bank Executive and Loan Officer Interviews 
Resp. Bank Title/Position Gender Age Company Tenure 
Industry 
Tenure Bank Description 
1 President/CEO M 64 37 years 37 years Small, Rural 
Community Bank 
2 Operations Manager M 29 3 years 5 years Large Regional Bank 
3 President M 47 14 years 23 years Small, Suburban 
Community Bank 
4 President M 66 34 years 34 years Midsize  
Community Bank 
5 Vice President, Senior Loan 
Officer 
M 57 32 years 32 years Small, Rural 
Community Bank 
6 Vice President, Branch 
Manager 
M 58 9 years 32 years Small, Rural 
Community Bank 
7 Vice President, Commercial 
Loan Officer  
M 34 13 years 13 years Small, Suburban 
Community Bank 
8 Vice President, Commercial 
Loan Officer 
M 33 7 years 15 years Midsize  
Community Bank 
9 Consumer Loan Officer M 47 11 years 29 years Large Regional Bank 
10 Senior Commercial Loan 
Officer 
M 59 25 years 33 years Midsize  
Community Bank 
11 Commercial Loan Officer M 45 4 years 20 years Midsize  
Community Bank 
12 Senior Commercial 
Underwriter 
M 60 5 years 30 years Large Regional Bank 
13 Senior Vice President, Real 
Estate Lending 
F 50 1.5 years 22 years Small Community 
Bank 
14 Vice President, Relationship 
Manager, Middle-Market 
Commercial 
F 43 7 years 21 years Large Super- 
Regional Bank 
15 Vice President, Customer 
Contact 
F 50 10 years 20 years Midsize  
Community Bank 




The following section describes thematically the results of the sixteen semi-
structured interviews with bank executives and loan officers.  The central themes of the 
interviews, included the evaluative criteria used in customer evaluation, the influence of 
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the economic environment on loan decisions, the role of the loan officer in loan 




Informants mentioned a variety of loan criteria factors.  Multiple informants 
referred to the “C’s of credit” used in loan evaluation.  A point of clarification regarding 
the term “credit”:  It became evident to the researcher that the universal jargon used for 
bank lending products is credit.  Therefore, credit in this discussion should not be 
mistaken for the credit score reported by credit bureaus.  Of the credit criteria used, a 66-
year old president of a fast-growing, mid-size bank referred to capital, collateral, 
character, and capacity as the C’s of credit evaluation. 
We look at the financial condition of the borrower, that is, or you 
can talk about the C’s of credit you know, capital, collateral, 
character, capacity…. Those are the things we look at. What is the 
financial condition of the borrower?  Is he strong or weak or what?  
What’s the capacity that he has to pay this, the loan?  We’ll look at 
his credit report.  Does his credit history tell us this should be a good 
credit?  Goes to the character part of it.  We look at the deal itself…. 
(#4, M – President) 
 
Other informants included in their C’s the customer’s credit score, reported from 
the credit bureau, and other conditions referring to the economic or market conditions.  
Although many bank executives and loan officers described similar factors for evaluating 
customer loan requests, not all banks assess these factors the same way.   
For example, at one of the banks, executive officers had differing perspectives on 
their bank’s use of subjective information in evaluating loan requests.  This bank’s 
president/CEO described to what degree his bank uses subjective information in response 
to what information is used to evaluate loan customers. 
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Not any more.  We used to…if you had good experience with a guy 
over the years you could make a judgment; any more you can’t do 
that.  You have to pretty well stick to your criteria on how you’re 
going to price it and if you are going to make it or not…. You have 
to justify, why you made the loan on your loan approval form, or 
why want to make the loan.  It has to be more than “I like him,” or 
that “he is a good guy,” or “I know him.”  You know that those are 
not sufficient any more. (#1, M – President/CEO) 
 
From the same bank, interestingly, a vice president/branch manager 
acknowledged how he sees the use of subjective factors in making loan judgments. 
There are [discretionary factors], you know.  Possibly the 
borrower’s family have been with ________[the bank] for 40 years.  
You know I think in a smaller bank like ours, this would come more 
into play.  You know I made one this week; he is a CFO for a 
company that has seven figure deposits with us.  Yeah, we are going 
to do all we can to keep this guy happy, ‘cause he is our contact for 
that business relationship to the other entity. 
 
Contradictory statements like these regarding loan criteria among bank executives 
in the same community bank present an important finding; that is, different perspectives 
do exist within and across banks in how they include subjective inputs when evaluating a 
customer’s loan request.  An operations manager of an on-line lending operation of a 
large regional bank provides further support for this internal contradiction regarding the 
subjective nature of evaluating customers. 
You would hope there isn’t [a subjective component], but I think in 
reality there is…. Good bank customer, been with the bank for 
years, large deposit accounts, they know someone or have some 
friend at the bank— we’ll maybe try a little harder on these loans to 
get them approved, compared to loans where there isn’t as many 
emotional or political ties to the loan….  I will give you an 
example… Oregon, recent loan, 91-acres, wooded property…  
Typically you’d say, “Hey, it’s going to be impossible to find comps 
for this property.”  But in this case, good bank customer, a couple 
hundred thousand in a deposit account, low interest paying account, 
good customer, never complains.  We took this to the head of 
underwriting of the bank and said, “Is this possible?” They said they 
would be willing do it if we could find additional comps.  So now 
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we have an appraiser out hunting for additional comps on this 
property. (#2, M – Operations Manager) 
 
From this dialogue it is clear that when banks evaluate loans for customers, the 
subjective judgment of bank officers influences the decision to give credit.  The 
following sections illustrate this conclusion with informant responses focused on the two 
most subjective criteria: the character of the borrower, and the bank’s relationship with 
the customer.  
Character. Of all the criteria discussed by informants, character appears the 
most subjective.  Informants said that evaluating the character of the borrower sometimes 
requires the subjective input of the loan officer and at other times the subjective inquiry 
of a bank loan committee.  The highly subjective nature of evaluating the character of the 
customer is evident by the multiple ways character is assessed.  One bank president 
explained that his bank uses the customer’s track record of paying bills and the reported 
credit score as proxy measures of the borrower’s character. 
Character is very important.  I mean if someone comes in and their 
credit is terrible…. You know if their credit is not good, that’s an 
indication of how they pay their bills, so probably we wouldn’t even 
consider it. (#4, M – President) 
 
A commercial underwriter with thirty years of industry experience described the 
objective and subjective evaluation of the customer’s character and then stated his belief 
that the subjective outweighs the objective when evaluating the perceived risk of the 
customer. 
The two most objective measures come from historical records, 
credit bureaus, and you get a subjective side of that which comes 
from the officer’s direct contact with the client.  He knows how they 
interact in the marketplace. Are they civic-minded? Are they 
involved?  Do they take care of their employees?  What kind of 
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business facilities do they maintain?  You know you get someone 
who’s pretty sloppy with their operation, it’s going to carry over to 
how well they take care of their finances as well…. 
 
Sometimes it’s a real fine line between the subjective evaluation and 
objective evaluation.  But it’s often the case that the subjective will 
outweigh the objective; in other words, the numbers will tell you 
that someone might be able to pay a loan, but the subjective 
evaluation will say you don’t want to take the risk.  (#12, M – 
Commercial Loan Underwriter) 
 
Prior experience with the customer appears to be the preferred measure of 
character, but in the absence of such prior history or experience, credit history may be a 
substitute measure of the customer’s character.   
In the early days in this bank, even before I was here, it was a small 
bank; everyone knew everyone; it was all in ______[name of city].  
And I remember a few of my first loan committees, “Well this is the 
son of Joe Blow….” That’s getting talked about less and less, 
because now we’ve spread into two counties; we’ve got ten to 
eleven branches….  Some of our borrowers we are not familiar with 
on any long-term basis. I think credit worthiness, credit history, that 
kind of stuff, almost has to be a substitute for that [character] 
because who knows what the character of that individual is… so we 
do what we can to check that.  If it is a repeat customer, I think it 
plays a big part in it, because we know the character, we had loans 
with the customer.  That makes a giant difference.  That definitely 
would be a mitigating factor even if everything else was average. 
(#8, M – VP/Commercial Loan Officer) 
 
Another proxy of character is the reputation of the customer in the community 
and industry.  Executives and loan officers in three banks described how they seek out the 
borrower’s reputation.  
A lot of the people, actually most of the people we deal with, are 
people we have been dealing with for years. So we know them.  We 
know their character, reputation in the industry.  You can usually 
find that out.  There is no real central… for example the credit 
bureaus do credit reporting, so that is a central way to get it; other 
than that, you have to go by reputation of the person in the 
community.  That is, there is no central way of finding it.  You get 
that by talking to people or if you have dealt with them, how they 
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deal with you.  If you have a new customer, about all you have to go 
off is the credit score, although we do occasionally have a loan come 
in, and the loan officer brings it in, and somebody says well you 
know I know this about that guy or gal and I think we need to be 
careful because here is something that happened with another deal I 
am acquainted with. (#4, M – President) 
 
Part of it is credit, but part of it is, have they’ve been in town long?  
Are they a person of their word?  If they say they are going to do 
something, is it done?  How do other people in town feel about 
them?  Is it somebody you hear, don’t do business with so and so; 
he’ll take you every chance he gets.  That’s not the kind of customer 
you want.  But we can’t deny someone for that one thing, not a 
hearsay thing.  But normally if that is the case there are several other 
problems too… other factors that are not good.  (#13, F – VP/Real 
Estate Dept.) 
 
In a community like the size of _______, word can get around and 
so there would be some people that we just wouldn’t get involved 
with even though there isn’t anything tangible that you could point 
your figure to. (#14, F – VP/Relationship Manager) 
 
In forming an evaluation of the customer, clearly no one factor is considered 
alone, but instead it is the “whole package,” “whole picture,” and “whole story” that 
“stacks together” to form a credit evaluation.  If this is true then it is no surprise that bank 
executives have their own beliefs in how criteria are interrelated.  For example, bank 
executives and loan officers referred to the relationship between the borrower’s character 
and his or her capacity or ability to repay the loan. 
I’ve often said character has a real direct relationship to capacity; I 
mean, there are people that as long as they’re able, they’ll pay you.  
But if, even the best of people if they get, you know, in over their 
heads, or if some things go against them, or some things happen in 
life that their capacity is done away with, then they can’t pay you no 
matter what their character is.  So we have to take that kind of thing 
in consideration. (#4, M – President) 
 
We see clients that have the ability to pay loans but don’t, and some 
that you wonder how they make it and they never miss a payment. 
(#12, M – Commercial Loan Underwriter) 
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They might have money, but they don’t pay their bills; that kind of 
shows lack of character as far as I am concerned.  You know they 
might not have the best cash flow, but they pay their bills on time.  
If they’re late, they call you, “I’m going to be three days late…” 
(#15 – F – VP/Customer Contact) 
 
In summary, of the C’s of credit evaluation that banks use to select their 
customers, how they evaluate the customer’s character is the most subjective.  
Furthermore bank informants revealed that no one factor determines whether a customer 
gets a loan or not, or what the terms of the loan are; instead, they weigh all the factors in 
combination to justify a loan decline or loan approval decision.  Often mentioned in the 
same breath as the character of the customer was whether the customer was a new or an 
existing customer of the bank.  The next dominant theme to surface from these interviews 
was the significant emphasis placed on the customer’s relationship with the bank. 
Customer Relationship. One of the recurring themes throughout the interviews 
was the emphasis on the bank’s relationship with the customer.  Although many of the 
banks have not adopted a formal customer relationship management (CRM) system, all 
of the informants expressed their interest and described the concerted effort their bank 
makes to loan to existing customers.  With some reluctance because of the potential of 
discriminating against new bank customers, one bank president/CEO admitted that his 
bank does consider the customer’s relationship in its loan decisions. 
We haven’t done too much of that, um what do they call it, C—M, 
yeah CRM, we have not done a lot of that [CRM].  You try to, you 
know, you have got a customer that you have experience with, that’s 
got good balances with you, hasn’t given you problems, those are 
positive things.  You try to make allowances for those, but you have 




Evident from the interviews was the idea that not only do banks value the 
relationship with their loan customers, but also the customers themselves appear to 
safeguard their relationship ties to their bank.  A bank president explained that even if 
customers are late in paying on other debts, if those customers keep current with the loans 
they have with his bank, the bank might have an increased interest in maintaining its 
relationship with them. 
Traditionally, experience with the lender carries a lot of weight.  We 
have some customers that occasionally may be delinquent, but they 
choose to be delinquent with others and not us; that means a lot.  If 
they are going to be delinquent, we’re glad that they keep us current. 
(#3, M – President) 
 
Most bank informants were very open about the importance of an established 
relationship with the customer when evaluating the credit of a customer.  One 31-year-old 
bank vice president candidly revealed his bank’s preference toward existing bank 
customers. 
If you’ve got an account here at the bank, you have got a lot better 
chance getting the loan then if you don’t.  A matter fact when I 
started here, the bank president would not loan to people who did 
not have an account with our bank.  But you can’t do that anymore. 
(#5, M – VP/Senior Loan Officer) 
 
Relationship management becomes part of the bank’s culture and as a result 
influences the responsibilities and effort of all bank employees, including loan officers 
and other customer contact employees.  The community banks described this as an 
integral part of their bank’s strategy.  One community bank executive discussed generally 
how community banks differ from larger banks and how his bank uses the customer 
relationship to its competitive advantage. 
I think most community banks focus on that customer relationship.  
When a customer walks into a large regional bank, sometimes they 
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don’t get the warm fuzzy feeling that they might at a smaller 
institution.  Also, most of the customers we know.  We try to know a 
lot about them.  We live in the community and are involved with 
them in community activities, or we are related or tied in with them 
some other way.  It’s that personalized service that we hope makes 
the difference, because there is a lot of banks out there, a lot of 
credit unions.  What makes us different today, may not be what 
differentiates us tomorrow so it’s a changing type of thing.  But if 
relationships are maintained, then hopefully that will be the bond 
that keeps bringin’em back. (#3, M – President) 
 
The trickle-down effect of a bank’s relationship strategy does impact loan 
evaluation.  Loan officer informants described how the bank’s protocol for relationship 
management influences loan evaluation decisions differently for new customers.   
If he is a brand new borrower to the bank and brand new to the 
industry, we are going to heavily scrutinize the potential for him to 
succeed.  In that case we might ask for things that are different. 
(#10, M – Senior Commercial Loan Officer) 
 
Furthermore, the emphasis on the customer relationship has created added 
awareness of the contribution loan officers make to the overall success of the bank’s 
relationship management strategy and has led banks and loan officers especially, to 
understand the distinction between transactional lending and relational lending.  
Relational lending is the desired practice for banks that have fully adopted a relationship 
management strategy.  Two commercial loan officers described how their bank’s 
emphasis on relational lending influences their loan decisions. 
They [the bank] like lending to relationships.  They are not big into 
just transactional loans.  Here is a guy that I found on the street; he’s 
just looking for a half a million-dollar term loan on real estate, but 
he’s got his relationship somewhere else.  They’re going to say, 
“Yeah you know if I feel like doing it great, but if we lose it no big 
deal.”  But if they [the customer] are willing to move their deposits 
here that goes a long way; if they’re willing to have their banking 
relationship with us, we are going to value that.  And if they have 
already been here for many years, we are really going to value that 
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one, that’s important… We just don’t want to have a transactional-
based portfolio. (#11, M – Commercial Loan Officer) 
 
Lending in this market is almost a loss-leader anymore, and so what 
is critical to us is to make it a relationship.  We don’t do 
transactional lending.  We are looking at getting the treasury 
management, selling insurance, you know, all that stuff…. We want 
to sell 8 or 10 products to every client, so it is broad based 
understanding of all their financial needs.  (#14, F – 
VP/Relationship Manager) 
 
In response to a follow-up question regarding the use of formal CRM strategy, 
one commercial loan officer revealed his personal strategy and desire to make multiple 
loans to his customers instead of single transactional loans. 
Well, it’s really great sometimes to hear the buzzwords from the big 
boys, but it all comes down to one thing, and one thing only, it’s the 
personal relationship between the banker and his customer that’s 
really going to make the difference….  I mean I want to deal with 
people for 20 years, and I have a lot of 20-year customers.  That’s 
what I am interested in.  I don’t want to do any one loan; I want to 
do a lifetime of loans.  (#10, M – Senior Commercial Loan Officer) 
 
However, various informants related how relational lending faces the challenge of 
convincing the loan committee to take a risk on existing customers.  One loan officer 
described the resistance she and others in her bank branch find with their bank’s loan 
committee. 
We’re into taking a few more risks up here, but sometimes we’re 
fighting tooth and nail to do it…. Some of the people may not look 
good on paper, but so many of us have been here in _______ 
[branch location] for years and know more about these people and 
previous things they’ve done….  Sometimes I think we are more 
willing to take risks on someone, because we do know them from 
other experiences…. Well just like loaning your best friend a 
hundred bucks; you’re going to take more risks on someone you 
know a whole lot more about…. ________ [main bank location] is 
just looking at paper. (#13, F - VP/Real Estate Dept.) 
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Informant responses support the notion that a preeminent reason for adopting a 
relational lending strategy is to take advantage of the efficiencies of working with the 
existing customer base.  One commercial loan officer that maintains a loan portfolio of 
thirty commercial customers with annual sales of $15 million to $500 million discussed 
the efficiencies resulting from working with existing customers. 
Existing clients are easier because you are already familiar with their 
management style.  You’re either comfortable with that or you’re 
not already and you don’t need to try to figure that out on a strange 
new company.  So we probably put more time in figuring out the 
management and the management style, and the industry for new 
clients, whereas with existing clients you know, ideally we are close 
enough in touch with them that when there is a request it’s not a big 
surprise.  And we understand the business reason behind it and it’s 
just that much easier to do. (#14, F – VP/Relationship Manager) 
 
Although these informants indicate that relational lending is the accepted practice, 
not all types of lending involve the include customer relationship as a factor in the 
evaluation.  A consumer loan officer described the process of evaluating a customer for a 
car loan as not changing for a new or existing customer. 
If a client comes in and says, “I’ve banked with you for 20 years.  I 
want a car loan,” I am still going to look at the same basic criteria 
for them than I do for anyone else.  They still need to be credit 
worthy. (#9, M – Consumer Loan Officer) 
 
It appears from this statement that the subjective value of the customer’s prior 
relationship to the bank is not always a relevant factor, especially when considering 
consumer lending products.  An explanation is that many banks have adopted a much 
more formal and centralized process for evaluating consumer loan requests.  The 
consumer loan officer cited defines and evaluates credit worthiness from his counterparts 
in commercial lending.  When asked about his loan evaluation process, this consumer 
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loan officer described a much more objective, automated process of credit scoring 
customers for the car loans and home equity products that he sells. 
My bank is centralized.  Most of the consumer loan applications go 
to a consumer loan center where they are processed and either 
approved or declined.  Then I have the option to take a second look 
at and decide if I want to override it, up to my lending limit….  We 
don’t do a lot of exceptions.  Usually if a loan center has made a 
decision, it’s based on good sound criteria.  I don’t have to do a lot 
of loan overrides. (#9, M – Consumer Loan Officer) 
 
Differences in the loan evaluation process exist not only between the different 
types of lending (e.g., consumer and commercial) but also between banks doing the same 
type of lending. To illustrate, a commercial loan officer and part-time college instructor 
described a conversation he had with a former student who was also a commercial loan 
officer at a large national bank. 
I had a student once that said, “Well at ________[my bank] we take 
the application and we fax it off to a center.  Then when we get our 
decline notice back we notify the customer.” I said, “What if you 
don’t (get a decline)?”  She said, “I have never done a loan, we’ve 
turned every one of them down.”  She had worked there for 2 
years…. They didn’t ask questions, they just scored it, and bam! 
(#11, M – Commercial Loan Officer) 
 
In summary, the customer’s relationship with the bank is an important factor in 
evaluating customer loan requests.  Community banks were more likely to include 
previous relationship in their evaluative criteria, especially when evaluating commercial 
loan customers.  Although most of the banks sampled have not adopted a formal CRM 
system, all of the banks to some degree value the relationship with their customers and 





A second theme was the influence of the economic environment on the loan 
evaluation process.  A commercial loan underwriter described the role of the marketplace 
in evaluating a customer’s commercial loan request. 
Is this a business that fits in the market?  Is it a business that is kind 
of going out of favor, people don’t want the widget anymore?  Or is 
it a new inventive type of thing, is it something on the leading edge 
and the company is just starting to develop it, the company has a lot 
of growth ahead of it, competition is favorable to it? You are not 
looking at somebody trying to start something that another business 
with greater capital could squeeze them out if they wanted to. (#12, 
M – Commercial Loan Underwriter) 
 
A commercial loan officer with twenty years of industry experience, both in 
multi-state regional and community banking, described what he has seen as the impact of 
the economic climate on commercial lending decisions. 
Wherever I have been it, [the economy] has been important and a 
consideration.  Like here at the bank—when I first got here the tech 
bubble hadn’t burst yet; it was on its way.  But things were still 
happening pretty strong in the construction area.  Then things started 
to slow down and people started noticing some problems and you 
started hearing this message: “Hey, as we talk to the regulators, as 
we talk to the economists, they say things are going to slow down.  
When that happens people’s cash flow tightens up.  We need to 
make sure we understand where our customers are at and where 
they’re going.  We’re not going to stretch as much.  We’re not going 
to go out on a limb as much.  You know it was the same thing that I 
heard at ______[regional bank] and ______[regional bank].  “We 
need to be careful where we’re at.  We want to take advantage of 
opportunity but we want everyone to understand that the outlook is a 
little cloudy and uncertain right now, so let’s be careful.” (#11, M – 
Commercial Loan Officer) 
 
From this statement it appears that banks adjust their criteria based on perceived 
economic opportunities and threats in the environment.  The same commercial loan 
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officer cited above related the following metaphor he had heard from a colleague 
regarding how adverse changes in the economy “expose” poor lending practices. 
If the economy is shrinking a little bit and the tide’s going out, we’re 
going to find out who’s been swimming without their trunks on.  
You’ll get a little embarrassed and you can get in some trouble for 
skinny dippin’ where you are not supposed to. (#11, M – 
Commercial Loan Officer) 
 
Another executive/loan officer related considering economic conditions when 
evaluating the loan request of a homebuilder. 
If I have a customer that has 3 spec houses out there and none of 
them have sold, and he wants to come in and do two more, I am 
going to look at that real closely. You’ve got three out there and if 
the economy is slowing down and things are not selling so well, then 
more than likely we are not going to make those…. When rates start 
climbing that might slow things down as well… customers are not 
going to want to buy those spec houses.  (#13, F - VP/Real Estate 
Dept.) 
These examples from informants suggest that the economic climate does in fact 
influence loan decisions.  Also, the economic factors may originate from the local, state, 
and/or national levels.  One commercial officer described his emphasis on responding to 
economic factors at the state level. 
Is it [the project] feasible given market conditions and within the 
general market we are dealing with here in ______[the state]?  I 
generally do not look or gauge much on the national market.  
Nationally we might have a shortage of rental properties, but in this 
market we have a glut. (#10, M – Senior Commercial Loan Officer).     
 
Once again banks vary in their responses to economic conditions.  For example, 
informants described circumstances in which their bank either relaxes or tightens its loan 
criteria based on the economic environment.  But altering the criteria may not be the only 
strategy.  One informant from a super-regional bank described her bank’s generally 
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conservative policies and stated that her bank is less likely than its competitor to alter or 
adjust its loan evaluation process. 
We tend to underwrite fairly conservatively, but what that means is 
that we are always steady, and so in bad times we are lending pretty 
much the same way that we loaned money in good times.  We are 
not swinging back and forth as our portfolio swings back and forth 
wildly.  A lot of banks— you will see them adjusting their credit 
criteria very dramatically from one year to the next.  And we don’t 
tend to do that.  We tend to be very stable and steady and our 
customers know what to expect from us. (#14, F – VP/Relationship 
Manager) 
 
In summary, an important factor that influences banks’ loan decisions is the 
economic conditions of the environment.  Depending on the bank and the type of lending, 
a bank may exercise flexibility in how it responds to economic trends at the local, state, 
or national levels.  Not all banks respond to economic conditions in the same way: some 
banks may be more conservative and less responsive to the environment, while some may 
be more risk-taking and more responsive to opportunities and threats in the environment. 
Role of the Loan Officer 
 
A third theme that emerged from these interviews was the importance of the 
individual officer in making loan decisions.  In support of this idea, informants described 
situations where the loan office influences decisions both when the officer has an 
individual lending authority/limit, and also when he or she “sells” the loan to a loan 
committee or a supervising authority.  A discussion of these two areas of influence 
follows. 
Lending Authority/Limits. Twelve of the sixteen informants were directly 
involved in lending to customers to some degree.  Of the twelve informants making 
loans, only one stated that he did not have a loan authority or lending limit.  The lending 
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limits of the informants ranged from $25,000 to $250,000.  In the cases where loan 
officers had a lending limit, informants described a process for approving loans up to 
their lending limit.  Bank executive informants reported that lending limits are based 
primarily on the loan officer’s tenure with the company and experience in the field.  One 
bank president said that lending authority is based on loan officers’ ability to evaluate a 
customer’s loan request. 
…We recognize that some [loan officers] have a greater capacity for 
trust than others.  I don’t mean trust in the honesty-dishonesty, but 
trust in their skill to make good decisions.  Their experience and 
their track record you know, they generally have higher loan limits 
than newer or younger or less experienced loan officers. (#4, M – 
President) 
 
Interestingly, all of the banks that have lending limits reward loan officers with a 
salary, a title, and in some cases a bonus or incentive program based on portfolio growth, 
delinquency rates, and fee income generated from that portfolio.  Two executives from a 
community bank described their strategy as being in a growth mode.  They were also 
considering changes in the pay structure of their loan officers to include an incentive plan 
that would reward loan officers for the new loans they originate and close.  One of these 
executives, the president/CEO, was reluctant to make this transition because he believed 
that an incentive-based pay structure might have a negative impact on his bank’s culture 
and the quality of its loans. 
We probably are going to move to an incentive plan here in the near 
future.  We have tried to avoid that because we think that it has the 
tendency for people to say “this is my loan, stay out of it.”  If I ask 
for your help, will you take a little of it and I will not get my little 
reward for it?  We want people to feel free to work with each other 
on it, bouncin’ the loan off of each other, work together without the 
idea that I get a dollar out of it and you don’t get any.  I just have 
seen so many of those that I am really leery about how that works. 
Sometimes it creates more problems.  We even want the customer to 
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know that they if they are comin’ in that they have got the whole 
staff.  But I am quite sure that has to change because the rest of the 
world doesn’t seem to accept that philosophy. (#1, M – 
President/CEO) 
 
Selling the Loan. The ability of the loan officer to prepare and present 
the case of the customer to either a bank loan committee, credit administrator, 
or another authorized bank officer was a requirement for loan officers across 
all of the banks sampled.  One commercial loan officer stated his responsibility 
when taking the loan to committee. 
My job is to sell the loan, my job is to help the loan committee 
understand the quantifying numbers.  This is why their profits are 
strong; this is why their days receivable are out of whack… to sell 
the story. (#11, M – Commercial Loan Officer). 
 
The loan officer’s preparation and knowledge of the file influences the judgment 
of those who approve the loan.  One commercial loan officer who also reviews the 
responsibility to review loans as part of his bank’s loan committee described the 
influence well-prepared loan officers have on loan decisions. 
They need to be prepared to answer questions first, and secondly, 
their presentation has to be of a nature where you want to ask 
questions.  Sometimes it comes up and you listen to it and you go, 
there is not a prayer that I am going to approve that.  You just know 
that everything they are saying is wrong.  So you don’t ask a 
question, there is no need.  But in other cases you have curiosities, it 
might simply be, “I didn’t know anybody was doing that.” Or, “I 
didn’t know anyone was in that particular geographic area.” (#10, M 
– Senior Commercial Loan Officer) 
 
However, although loan officers are expected to sell the loan, sometimes their 
unavoidable attachment challenges their ability to remain objective while trying to sell 
the loan to a committee or a credit administrator.  One commercial underwriter described 
this challenge.  
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Sometimes a loan officer gets so close to a credit that they convince 
themselves.  The real test is if can you convince someone else that 
doesn’t know the customer. (#12, M – Commercial Loan 
Underwriter) 
 
Bank executives recognized this challenge this presents to their loan approval 
process.  One bank president mentioned the consideration his bank has for loan officers 
representing their loan clients in loan committee. 
Obviously loan officers when they come to loan committee need to 
feel good about the loan.  They need to feel strong about it.  But they 
also don’t want to influence, you know, they don’t want to show 
their cards so to speak.  They want the loan to able to stand on its 
own.  So they make an effort to point out the positive aspects of a 
credit without perhaps expressing too much of their personal feeling 
about the loan.  But in the end we want our loan officers to feel good 
about a credit they are presenting.  Sometimes it’s shot down and 
egos are bruised a little bit, but the process works.  It’s good.  We 
like them to take ownerships for the credits they bring…. (#3, M- 
President). 
 
Obviously not all loan officers are equally effective in selling loans to a 
committee or a credit administrator.  One bank president described the influence a loan 
officer with a good track record has over officers with less experience. 
The track record of our loan officers is certainly a big part in his 
influence in the bank.  We have some loan officers that have very 
large portfolios.  They’ve developed good relationships with 
customers over many years and they are pretty astute in knowing 
what a good credit is and what the risks to the credit are.  And when 
they come in to committee, if it is a larger loan that’s over their 
limit, the committee may have more confidence in, say, in one loan 
officer over another, because of his experience, his track record, 
how he deals with the committee. (#4, M – President) 
 
This bank president then compared the differences he sees in his loan officers to children 
in a family and their strengths and weaknesses to horses in a popular American film. 
It’s a little bit like managing a family. Each of your children are 
different…that’s one of the advantages that we have as a smaller 
institution is that we know our loan officers pretty well, all of our 
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people.  And we know what their strengths and weaknesses are and 
we know how much rope to give and how much to hold the reins a 
little tighter on some.  I sometimes refer to the old Ben Hur movie 
where the old Arab had these two horses… the one was the race 
horse and the one was the steady one, and he put the steady on the 
inside and the race horse on the outside.  This made a good team.  
That’s really what we kind of try to do. (#4, M – President) 
 
In summary, the role of the loan officer involves exercising influence in preparing 
and selling the loan.  The track record of the loan officer appears to be a factor in the 
evaluation of customer loan files.  These conclusions are based primarily on information 
related to the commercial lending process. 
 
Regulators and Bank Examiners 
 
The final theme that emerged from these interviews was the distinct and 
widespread perceptions of the role of federal and state regulators/bank examiners and 
how these perceptions influence loan decisions.  Also related is how these perceptions 
varied according to the size of the bank.  The discussion here centers on the different 
perspectives of bank regulation and how these perceptions influence the evaluation of 
customer loan requests.  A more detailed description of the role of regulation and policy 
is reserved for a follow-up study involving interviews with informants from state and 
federal regulatory agencies.   
One vice-president/senior loan officer revealed his bank’s recent examination and 
described the outcome and the process his bank is using to become more compliant with 
examiners’ requests. 
As you are aware, you have to be real careful with truth-in-lending 
and not discriminating and stuff like that.  So what we do, and the 
bank examiners were here a short time ago, and said, “look you 
guys, you need to be more consistent in the way you price your 
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loans too.”  Because they were seeing variances and I have done 
some analyses too, and they are right.  We were seeing a variation 
between men, women, and different ethnicities as well.  So, we now 
provide the loan officers with a rate sheet that runs off the credit 
report and debt-to-income ratio.  And if the person meets those 
criteria, they are probably going to get the loan. (#5, VP/Senior 
Commercial Loan Officer) 
 
Later in his interview he responded passionately to what he sees as a trend toward the 
decreasing use of discretionary factors when evaluating loan customers. 
That is diminishing, and diminishing, and diminishing, which I 
don’t like.  You hit a nerve with me.  Bank examiners and your 
external auditors and the consumer groups, they’re taking all the 
discretion away from you being a banker anymore.  What the bank 
examiners would like us to become is just order-takers.  You know, 
take the loan application, send it to some central office and if it 
meets their criterias then make the loan, and it comes back and send 
them on their way.  I don’t like that, but that is the way the industry 
is going.  And I think they are trying to take any favoritism, 
discretion, whatever word you want to use for that, out of the hands 
of the lender and treat everyone just like robots…. (#5, VP/Senior 
Commercial Loan Officer) 
 
He added that his community bank attempts to survive in a highly competitive 
marketplace and that regulations complicate how community banks attempt to 
differentiate themselves from the larger banks. 
The only way we can compete with the ________ [regional bank] 
and ________ [super-regional bank] is if we do value the customer 
and if we can have a banking relationship and when they come in we 
say, “How are you doing Heather?  It is nice to see ya.”  If we don’t 
provide that, if we don’t let them know that we like them, and what 
they are doing, they can go to _____ or _____ and be treated like a 
number.  That is the flustrating part of bank regulations.  They are 
trying to put less and less value on your existing customer base 
‘cause you are discriminating against somebody that you don’t know 
by showing a little favoritism to someone that you know and value 
and appreciate.  It’s a fine line and a tough act to really get done. 
(#5, VP/Senior Commercial Loan Officer) 
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These issues surrounding regulations were salient for many informants.  Another 
VP/branch manager demonstrated this salience when evaluating two customers with the 
same credit score. 
What makes it hard is that you have to use your judgment a little bit.  
But the examiners come in and that makes their job hard, ‘cause 
maybe you do a loan for this guy that has a 650, but turn down this 
guy that has a 650. (#6, M – VP/Branch Manager) 
 
Another vice president/commercial loan officer described his awareness of 
regulators when considering discretionary or subjective factors. 
We really try to steer away from those [subjective factors].  That is 
primarily due to FDIC examiners.  They like to see everything pretty 
objective and pretty cut-and-dried.  We try to stay away from other 
factors that may influence us, just because we want to be fair to 
everyone that is applying for credit.  (#7, VP/Commercial Loan 
Officer) 
 
A loan officer at a community bank reminisced how regulators had influenced the 
lending exceptions at his previous employer, a fast-growing multi-state bank. 
You can’t have 500 branches and each taking advantage of each of 
their local opportunities and running in their own direction, because 
[if] you got 500 people going in 500 directions, you end up saying 
we all need to come together and head in the same direction which 
means hey, we are credit scoring as far as the lending process goes.  
If we set a precedence here, we take one step out of policy here, then 
all of a sudden we have to do that, so when regulators come in and 
say how come you are doing this kind of lending in ______[city] 
and you’re not in ______[city] or in ______[city], so the regulators 
come in and really enforce that you got to do things the same way.  
If you turn down this loan you’ve got to turn them all down that are 
like that.  If you make this loan you have to make them all like that. 
(#11, M- Commercial Loan Officer)  
 
Continuing in his reminiscences of this past experience and comparing it to his current 
employer, he related an example of how banks respond to regulation differently. 
I had one just a few months ago where it was a decline.  He had a 
low credit score, had this, that, and the other.  But because there is 
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an opportunity to pick up some business down the road, it was a 
very low advance rate on the collateral, so we felt like we were safe 
and covered but we also spent 15-20 minutes discussing compliance 
issues.  What’s going to happen if the regulators come in and find 
out here is a white male person applying for a single credit?  If this 
was a woman or a Hispanic, or if this was a non-profit organization 
would we make this loan?  Yeah we would do it in a second because 
we are doing it now!  So we need to make sure if they find we have 
declined loans like this, we are going to be criticized heavily for it.  
It [regulation] is taken in consideration, but where you have a 
portfolio that spans a fifty mile area from ________(city) to 
_______ market, it is a little bit easier to sort through stuff and say 
we are doing these kinds of loans, or we haven’t done them in the 
past, whereas if you’re a multi-state organization, it’s really hard to 
say are we doing this or not in California, Washington, Idaho, 
Arizona, Nevada, so you just say we are not doing it and not doing it 
no matter what. (#11, M- Commercial Loan Officer) 
 
As this example and others show, banks respond differently to the policies and 
legal pressures of regulations and frequent bank examinations.  However, based on the 
example and opinion expressed of the commercial underwriter informant, one perception 
is that community banks in general feel less constrained and pressured by regulations 
because the regulatory focus is much greater for the larger regional banks since they pose 
a more significant economic threat in the case of failure.  Therefore, community banks 
get away doing “good ’ole boy loans,” or loans that are justified primarily on subjective 
factors. 
Even though community banks will have the same regulatory 
requirements, the regulators will often look at smaller community 
banks with a jaundiced or a blind eye, or however you want to put it, 
from the standpoint, not only do they recognize they service a 
certain segment of the community and given their size.  Even if they 
went under they don’t pose enough of a risk to the community as a 
whole that the financial welfare of the people would go bad.  But 
you get into a larger one like ______, _______ or ________, then 
the regulators get real tight because they assume when you get that 
big if you start getting on the wild side, you can really impact the 
economy of a whole region by going south with your credit 
portfolio…. They [community banks] do what we call good ’ole boy 
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loans.  And that sometimes is a good thing, but in a bank the size of 
______[our bank] you couldn’t afford to do that because you are 
touching too many good ‘ole boys.  In a smaller community bank 
they can monitor their own credit portfolio, but they do have the 
tendency just simply because of the size and because they get clients 
where they know their clients, where “I knew their granddad.  I 
knew the dad.  I’m pretty sure what the kid’s going to do… he was 
raised right.”  And they will make the loan.  And with ______ [our 
bank] we might know the same customers and be willing to make 
the same loan, but the regulators hammer the wise out of us. (#12, M 
– Commercial Loan Underwriter) 
 
In the process of conducting interviews, it was evident that regulation plays an 
important role in how loan decisions are made, but the process that bank examiners 
follow when reviewing a bank was not an issue until one informant, a CEO and founder 
of a small community bank, mentioned that examiners focus their attention on how well 
the bank stays within the specific policies drafted and approved internally.  He also 
compared the policies of small banks to large banks, suggesting that banks of different 
sizes will operate within different set of guidelines. 
There are numerous policies that have to be employed by every 
lending institution.  They have to be written policies and they have 
to be approved by the board of directors initially, and most of them 
approved annually on an on-going basis. Those policies are drafted 
to incorporate bank policy and any regulatory restrictions.  And 
primarily what the regulators do when they come in and review our 
policies is, number one, that we are within any legal guidelines that 
may apply or regulatory guidelines, and two, that our policies are 
consistent with who we are.  Obviously a smaller bank may do 
business somewhat different than a larger bank, and it’s a product of 
size sometimes.  But they [examiners] want to make sure that our 
policies are sound and that we are abiding by the policies (#16, M – 
CEO). 
 
The CEO informant continued explaining the actual process of the examination 
and the emphasis of the examiners. 
All examinations are what they call risk-based, in other words they 
look where they feel the greatest risk is to the institution, that is 
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primarily in loans.  They look at our larger loans, almost all of our 
larger loans, and then they take a sampling of smaller loans.  And 
they look at them to see if the story makes sense, if in their opinion 
they come to the same conclusion that the bank did when making 
the credit – that it’s a sound credit, one that should be made.  
Occasionally you run into a situation where you may have a 
difference of opinion or something like that.  But most of the time 
regulators, when that happens, you have a chance to sit-down and 
tell them the story or clarify some points that they may have.  So, 
you know, [it] doesn’t get really adversarial very often (#16, M – 
CEO). 
 
In summary, bank regulations and those federal and state agencies that enforce 
them have an important stake in how banks evaluate the customer loan requests.  This is 
demonstrated in the different responses from community banks and larger regional banks.  
The perceptions of many bank informants is that regulators insist that banks become 
more standardized in their loan evaluation process and that the enforcement of these 
policies may be more strict for larger banks than it is for community banks because of the 
more widespread economic impact and risk of the larger banks.  The researcher cautions 
that these conclusions may be biased and single-sided, since these conclusions are based 
on the perspectives of bank executives and loan officers only. Therefore, in a follow-up 
study, additional interviews were conducted with state and federal bank examiners. The 
procedure and findings from this follow-up study provide greater depth and explanatory 




As a means of further exploring the influence of federal and state regulations on 
customer selection in banking, follow-up interviews were conducted with five state and 
federal examiners/regulators.  Two of the informants worked in a supervisory role at the 
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state level, one was the state supervisor of banks responsible for all aspects of banking in 
his state, and the other was the state supervisor of consumer credit and compliance.  The 
other three informants were bank field examiners either employed by the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), or the state or were self-employed independent 
contractors.  Represented in the sample were examiners that had current or past 
experience with the two areas of examination – safety and soundness and compliance.  




Respondent Characteristics - Federal and State Regulators/Examiners 
 
Resp. Position/Title Gender Age Tenure (Examiner/Regulator)
1 State Supervisor of Banks M 41 15 years 
2 State Supervisor of Consumer 
Credit and Compliance 
F 52 13 years 
3 FDIC Senior Compliance Officer M 46 18 years 
4 State Examiner (Safety & 
Soundness/Compliance) 
F 32 5.5 years 
5 Federal Reserve Independent 
Contractor (Safety & Soundness) 
F 38 16 years 
The focus and process of the two types of bank examinations are very distinct 
from one another.  Safety and soundness examinations focus on risks to the bank and to 
the FDIC system.  These examinations are conducted more frequently, typically every 
twelve to eighteen months.  Consumer compliance examinations evaluate a bank’s 
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compliance with policy and regulations as it pertains to protecting consumer interests.  
These examinations occur less frequently, typically every two to three years.  
A semi-structured telephone interview format was used.  Open-ended questions 
were asked and the average duration of the interviews was 30 minutes.  A presentation of 




Regulators have a vested interest in a bank’s customer selection process, 
especially as it pertains to practices posing threats to the FDIC, to the economy at large, 
and to protected consumer classes.  Safety and soundness and consumer compliance 
examinations are the two types of examinations that banks undergo.  Federal and state 
examiners cooperate to conduct these examinations concurrently.  The results of 
interviews with five state and federal bank regulators/examiners regarding each type of 
examination are discussed separately, with a focus on the impact of these policies on 
customer selection decisions. 
Safety & Soundness. Safety and soundness (SS) examinations are based on the 
CAMELS rating.  Upon the completion of each SS exam, the bank is assessed a 
CAMELS rating score (1, the best – 5, the worst).  The acronym CAMELS refers to SS 
guidelines: capital adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings, liquidity, and 
sensitivity to interest rate.  Capital adequacy is concerned with whether the bank 
maintains enough capital on its balance sheets to offset its liabilities.  Asset quality refers 
to the quality of loan collateral and how well bank assets hold loan value.  Management 
refers to the management structure (i.e., senior executives and board of directors) in place 
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and what management is doing in terms of bank governance.  Earnings is concerned with 
the profitability of the bank.  Liquidity refers to the bank’s setup regarding available cash.  
Sensitivity to interest addresses how a bank has structured its balance sheet to minimize 
risk with interest rate changes.  These criteria reflect the focus of these examinations on 
minimizing risk for the bank, the economy, and the FDIC program.  One informant 
described how the risk assessment and risk management philosophy of the Federal 
Reserve in a SS exam trickles down to reviewing loans. 
You want to make sure that in fact it is a collectable loan, because if 
it is not, then you are overstating capital.  It is a one-by-one process.  
It is done by a sampling basis.  But the crux of it really boils down 
to making sure that the loans on a bank’s book are in fact 
collectable, because of if they’re not, then there is going to have to 
be charged some capital and earnings.  Then it, ultimately, gets back 
to the FDIC, whether or not there is some capital to cover the risks 
on the bank’s balance sheet. Then if not, does this pose a threat?  Is 
it potentially going to be a claim against the FDIC fund? (#5, F – 
Federal Reserve Contractor) 
 
In evaluating the loan evaluation process in an SS examination, examiners use 
sampling procedures to review the criteria.  SS examiners are interested mainly in 
quantitative criteria.  As one informant described it, it “boils down” to the collectability 
of the loan as it pertains to the borrower’s capacity to repay the loan. 
But it really boils down to the collectability, and that covers a 
variety of factors, like does the borrower have the wherewithal to 
repay the loan?  Is it a viable business?  Is it an individual that has 
earning’s potential?  (#5, F – Federal Reserve Contractor) 
 
As one informant described the difference between SS and compliance issues, SS 
examinations are primarily “economy-driven,” whereas compliance issues are related 
more to management controls.  Because SS issues are economy driven, it is no surprise 
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that a state supervisor of banks discussed the influence of the environment on bank 
lending activity. 
We don’t like to see a lot of speculation, but obviously right now we 
are in an increasing rate environment, so we would like to see banks 
take that into account…. We see a lot of competition of course, and 
with competition banks are taking a tighter margin for the loans.  
They are maybe not underwriting them as they should, because the 
bank down the street won’t require certain information, and “so if 
we want this loan we can’t require that information.”  (#1, M – State 
Supervisor of Banks) 
 Specific loan criteria were discussed relative to what examiners hope to 
see when they open approved loan files.  One examiner noted the importance 
of the borrower’s experience in his or her particular industry. 
I just can’t emphasize how important it is when looking at credit risk 
and asset quality in each loan transaction, how important 
management is in commercial lending.  I’m seeing that more and 
more all the time.  If you make a loan to someone who doesn’t have 
experience in that business, there is a high probability in default.  It 
is really important in making a credit decision, very, very important. 
(#5, F – Federal Reserve Contractor) 
 
The loan examination process zeros in on loans that make policy exceptions.  
Regulators like to see few exceptions; however, when exceptions are made, regulators 
zero in on whether exceptions follow the bank’s prescribed policy.  Two informants 
described their concern about loan exceptions. 
If there is a lot of policy exceptions to get a loan through and 
approved and the underwriting is somewhat less than adequate then 
that’s where the concern would come from us. (#1, M – State 
Supervisor of Banks) 
 
If exceptions are made, how well are they justified and documented.  
For me a consistent application of policy is key.  Then if deviations 




Exceptions are often made where strong quantitative factors substitute for other 
weaker quantitative factors.  One informant referred to the decision-making process of 
making exceptions and gave examples of “sloppy” reasons for policy exceptions. 
It’s a case-by-case situation.  It’s not just going through the process, 
we’ve violated this policy and some sloppy reason is given.  Then 
that is not going to pass.  It’s going to be looked at.  Was it a valid 
reason?  Was it justified?  You might see a situation where a bank 
makes a loan and the bank has a policy that they will only loan up to 
70% of the value on a piece of real estate.  That’s their policy.  Let’s 
say they have a borrower that they just lent 75% to.  A valid reason 
might be that the borrower has a strong liquidity position or they 
have an extremely impeccable track record, good credit, or all of the 
above.  These are good reasons why we think it is good to take that 
added risk.  But if you just say something like it’s a beautiful 
building, that is pretty plain.  There needs to be pretty good credit 
reasons that mitigate that risk, those are the reasons that you are 
willing to take that bet.  Or, “I know that person, he is really good 
friend.”  That would not be a good reason. (#5, F – Federal Reserve 
Contractor) 
 
In summary, SS examinations concentrate on assessing the risks associated with 
bank practices, especially the bank’s lending practices.  SS examinations focus primarily 
on reviewing the quantitative criteria used in loan evaluation, but other “soft” criteria do 
come into play.  Policy exceptions are an area of concern that regulators key in on when 
reviewing a bank. 
Consumer Compliance. Consumer compliance (CC) examinations are primarily 
concerned with reviewing a bank’s activities regarding consumer protection regulations, 
including for example, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act (HMDA), Truth in Lending Act (TILA), Flood Disaster Protection Act, 
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), and Fair Housing Act (FHA), and 
privacy of consumer financial information.  This list is only a sample of the consumer 
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protection regulations associated with banking.  One informant joked about the increasing 
emphasis on consumer protection in banking. 
We have all these new compliance regs, but when they make a new 
one they never take an old one out, so it grows and grows.  So there 
is a lot of compliance regulations that they have to follow and it’s a 
burden, you know; it’s a lot of work, but they have to do it.  We 
recognize that and so do they.  (#2, F – State Supervisor of 
Consumer Credit and Compliance) 
 
Because CC involves so many regulations, examiners conduct a risk assessment 
of the different areas of bank operation prior to going into the bank.  To do so, they 
review information they have requested from the bank, especially a bank’s policies 
regarding consumer compliance and a bank’s track record as reflected by prior CC 
examinations.  Once the examiner has a sense of the risk areas a particular bank, he or 
she pull sample files.  For example, an informant described the process that he follows to 
sample HMDA loans. 
We always look at HMDA loans, which are mortgage loans, no 
matter what the percentage a bank makes a business in them…. We 
take the whole Excel spread of rates and borrower, and maybe the 
first time we’ll pull out female borrowers.  What I will typically do 
is bold female borrowers down the line, then do a sort on rates to see 
for instance as a snapshot to see if those rates go down on the 
bottom with the highest rate.  That’s a red flag, naturally.  What we 
would like to see is disbursements throughout.  That’s on the first 
simple snap-shot….  We in fact look to see that loans that were 
made had either as good or worse criteria than for those that were 
denied.  So in other words if someone that was a female was denied 
for a FICO of let’s say 650, their Fair Isaac score, and they [loan 
officers] say they didn’t have enough income.  Then let’s say we 
pull a loan and it was to a male and it shows that they have a 650 
FICO and basically the same thing, but they made the loan.  Then 
there is an issue that we need to follow up with management to say 
why was this person made a loan and not the other person? (#3, M – 
FDIC Senior Compliance Officer) 
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As with SS examinations, informants described the importance of board and 
management oversight.  One compliance officer referred to the importance of bank 
management in CC as a “top-down approach,” where the policies, philosophies, and 
practices of senior management and the board of directors are heavily scrutinized for CC 
issues.  Another examiner noted the importance of a formalized bank compliance 
program in determining the extent to which sample files are evaluated. 
We don’t go in and do transaction testing on all of them.  We look to 
see what compliance program the bank has in place.  We look at 
their program and then determine if there is any areas we need to do 
transaction testing on, or if the program that they have in place is 
sufficient for them to identify errors on their own without us coming 
in and doing transaction testing.  (#4, F - State Examiner) 
 
Another interesting finding was that informant responses affirmed what bank 
executive and loan officer informants described as different regulatory processes for 
different types and sizes of banks.  As an example, one informant described such 
differences. 
[The examination process] is based on the bank’s everything!  The 
bank’s size, its market, its history, its focus, its marketing, the 
products, who it’s target marketing and so on, it just depends.  We 
work with banks in the biggest cities and the smallest towns.  
Obviously in the way we look at banks in the smaller towns is going 
to be much different than the larger in the way they operate is much 
different.  There’s much more risk on fair lending and so-called 
compliance consumer risk in the larger banks because they don’t 
know their population a lot of times so there is.  They have to 
assume that there is potentially fair lending [issues].  There is a wide 
range of ethnic groups in their assessment area, so they have to be 
very cognizant that they have to be fair any time someone of an 
ethnic group or protected class is borrowing or wanting credit.  So 
there are much more factors in larger markets. It’s basically 
assessing the risk regardless, but it tends to be less risk in a smaller 
bank because of the volumes you are dealing with [in larger 
banks]…. (#3, M – FDIC Senior Compliance Officer) 
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Civil penalties that can be levied on banks because of compliance related issues 
can be astronomical.  Two of the informants described specific examples of compliance 
failures that resulted in banks being disciplined. 
I’ve heard horror stories… a system where a bank would use a 
scoring system and for the loan officer’s neighbor they’d override 
the rate and for the Hispanic borrower they’d override it and raise it.  
(#2, F – State Supervisor of Consumer Credit and Compliance) 
 
A concern nowadays is to get into the factual, empirical data as 
opposed to the old days where you’d handshake loan….  And we 
have seen that, I’ve just seen it recently.  You wouldn’t believe the 
terribly lousy loans, safety and soundness, and underwriting, 
because they (bank/loan officers) felt or get in these positions where 
they can’t turn these people down because they know them and they 
are a small community.  It’s really a spiral they knew they were in.  
If they would’ve stuck to the rate sheets and credit score they 
wouldn’t be in the trouble that they are. (#3, M – FDIC Senior 
Compliance Officer) 
 
The most surprising finding in this follow-up study was the lack of compliance 
issues associated with commercial or business lending.  Informants all agreed that there 
are many fewer compliance-related regulations for commercial lending.  The state 
supervisor of compliance revealed that she often receives inquiries regarding compliance 
issues in commercial cases, but deflects those complaints because they are not 
“consumer” issues. 
Like I said, they’re called consumer protection regulations for a 
reason— because they protect consumers…. I have this discussion 
every day with somebody who has a business account and wants me 
to go after the bank because they do not like how their business 
account is being handled and I just tell them, “You know what?  
You are not a consumer; consumer protection laws do not apply.  If 
you don’t like what you got from the bank and if you have a 
contractual agreement, see if they are violating it.  And if they are 
then sue’em!  If they’re not and you have agreed to it, you’ve got a 
contract.  You don’t like it, go somewhere else.”  I am very… I 
don’t mean to sound too harsh or hard-nosed, but consumer 
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protection regulations do not apply. (#2, F – State Supervisor of 
Consumer Credit and Compliance) 
 
A compliance officer revealed that he analyzes commercial bank products less 
because commercial loans are not covered under consumer compliance.  Later in his 
interview, he explained why less emphasis is given to compliance in commercial 
banking. 
To be honest with you, commercial loans, for our purposes, are 
not… there’s not that many issues with them as far as consumer 
compliance because they’re not consumer loans, so it really 
mitigates our analysis on commercial products…. 
 
In essence, the world has decided that the commercial borrower 
should be savvy by and large…. They ought to know more of the 
financial aspects.  It’s [compliance regulations] really protecting the 
smaller guys.  Now that’s not to say fair lending is, when you think 
about fair lending and what that really means, that’s the only real 
criteria that overrides everything.  So if they are being treated fairly 
then they don’t need… let’s say for a commercial property they 
don’t need a RESPA and all the other consumer-related 
documents….  The lowest common denominator is a first-time 
homebuyer; that is why you have all these documents… whereas in 
commercial, these people know the market, they don’t need 
disclosures, they [the government] are not as worried about the 
individual being dooped in what they are doing. (#3, M – FDIC 
Senior Compliance Officer) 
 
To summarize, CC examinations are focused on protecting consumer interests, 
with “consumer” is defined as “noncommercial customers.”  Also customer acquisition 
decisions in practice should be consistent with the policy and regulation controls of 




The interviews with sixteen bank executives/loan officers and the five follow-up 
interviews with federal and state regulators/examiners revealed interesting and important 
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insights into customer selection decisions.  Based on the research questions, this study 
investigates the quantitative and subjective factors that influence customer selection 
decisions as they pertain to bank lending.   
Four themes emerged from the responses from bank executives and loan officers.  
Theme 1 was that loan officers rely on various types of information when making a loan 
decision. Banks differ on what evaluative criteria are used and how these factors are 
assessed.  These differences were especially evident in commercial lending.  Some 
information was quantitative (e.g., borrower’s credit, capacity, capital, and loan 
collateral) and other was subjective (e.g., character/reputation).  All the banks sampled 
used universal quantitative measures (e.g., FICO credit score), however, these banks 
differed on the acceptable thresholds of these factors.  Bank and individual differences in 
assessing criteria were most pronounced when informants described the subjective 
criteria in loan evaluation.  The character/reputation of the customer appears to be the 
most subjective factor in credit evaluation because of the multiple ways that bank loan 
officers assess it.  Character is measured by a variety of proxies including experience 
with the customer, credit history, and community/industry reputation.  Also mentioned 
repeatedly was the subjective importance of the bank’s relationship with the customer.  
The interviews suggest that loan officers give preferential treatment to existing customers 
with an established relationship with the bank (i.e., relationship lending versus 
transactional lending). 
Theme 2 was that economic conditions influence the loan evaluation process.  
Some banks adjust their criteria depending on economic trends, whereas others are more 
stable and less likely to adjust their policies to these trends.  Although most of the bank 
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informants described their bank’s strategy as being conservative, some informants 
described bank personalities that were more aggressive and risk taking for commercial 
loan business during slumping economic conditions.  Conditions in the local, regional, 
and national economy were cited as impacting the number of loan exceptions and the 
emphasis on bank loan portfolio growth. 
Theme 3 suggested that the job description of loan officers permits individual 
decision-making in customer selection.  The interview suggests that loan officers have 
the most influence when they make decisions within a prescribed lending limit or 
authority.  Loan officers also appear to differ in how carefully they individually adhere to 
bank policy and procedures when making loan exceptions.  The extent of the influence 
this chronic need for discretion has on the behavioral tendencies of commercial loan 
officers is explored in Study 2.   
 Theme 4 was that the loan evaluation and decision process is influenced by the 
extent to which federal and state bank examiners enforce bank regulations.  Bank 
executives and loan officers have different perceptions of the role of regulation on 
commercial lending decisions.  Follow-up interviews with regulators and bank examiners 
revealed that most consumer compliance regulations do not apply to commercial lending.  







The central focus of this research is to investigate the factors that influence seller 
decisions to accept or reject business from a customer.  Based on the cue diagnosticity 
perspective (Feldman and Lynch 1988), a conceptual model is proposed and tested.  
Based on the cue diagnosticity perspective, it is predicted that customer quantitative 
merit, customer reputation, and the decision-maker’s need for discretion will interact to 
influence customer selection likelihood.  Additionally, customer risk assessment, attitude 
toward the customer, and perceived value of the customer are proposed to have 
intervening effects on customer selection likelihood.   
This chapter describes the conceptual development and methodology of the 
experimental study to answer research questions three and four. 
3. What are the joint effects of customer quantitative merit, customer reputation, and 
the decision-maker’s need for discretion on customer selection likelihood? 
 
4. What are the intervening effects of customer risk assessment, attitude toward the 
customer, and perceived value of the customer on customer selection likelihood? 
 
This chapter begins with a discussion of the conceptual framework that supports 
the hypotheses derived from research question #3, followed by the experimental model 
with construct definitions and the proposed hypotheses.  In the second section, the 
methodology for this study is outlined, including the steps taken to develop the 
experimental scenario and the need for discretion (NFD) scale, and the results of pre-tests 
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conducted with commercial loan officers and MBA and undergraduate students.  Finally, 
the results of this study are presented in response to each of the research questions. 
Conceptual Framework 
 
Evaluative judgments are based on two types of cues: (1) information that pertains 
to the essence of the target to be evaluated (e.g., professional experience of a job 
candidate) and (2) information that relates to the person’s subjective response to the 
target (e.g., charisma of the job candidate) (Pham and Avnet 2004).  Information from 
both types of cues combines to form a judgment (e.g. to hire or not to hire the job 
candidate).  The cue diagnosticity perspective is the framework for proposing hypotheses 
surrounding how information pertaining to “the essence” of the evaluative target (e.g., the 
customer’s credit score) combines with the loan officer’s subjective response to the target 
(e.g., the customer’s reputation) to form a probability judgment of a loan decision (i.e. 
approval or decline).   
The cue diagnosticity perspective suggests that multiple cues combine to form 
overall judgments and that the extent to which a specific cue is utilized varies with its 
diagnosticity (Feldman and Lynch 1988; Slovic and Lichtenstein 1971).  Cue 
diagnosticity suggests that decision-makers use the available cues to place the evaluation 
object into a specific category (Feldman and Lynch 1988; Skowronski and Carlston 1987, 
1989).  Cues that suggest one categorization over alternative categorizations are referred 
to as diagnostic, and diagnosticity is the extent to which the cue is perceived as reliable in 
discriminating between alternative categorizations or interpretations (Purohit and 
Srivastava 2001).   
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The cue diagnosticity perspective was originally used to understand measurement 
effects on surveys, and more specifically how the answers to previous questions provides 
the respondent with additional information that is useful in answering subsequent 
questions (Feldman and Lynch 1988).  Generalized beyond these measurement 
applications, the primary contribution of cue diagnosticity is that it suggests that 
individuals may selectively use information when forming judgments. 
Consumer research has explored a variety of judgments using a cue diagnosticity 
framework, including consumer product evaluations (Aaker and Maheswaran 1997; 
Purohit and Srivastava 2001) and responses to advertisement (Pham and Avnet 2004). 
Similarly, as consumers evaluate the quality of products using a variety of cues (Cox 
1962; Rao and Monroe 1988; Richardson, Dick, and Jain 1994), the quality and value of 
an individual customer can be evaluated using an array of cues.  The generalizibility of 
the use of information cues in product evaluation judgments to judgments surrounding 
human beings is well supported by work on impression formation (Skowronski and 
Carlston 1987, 1989).  Along these lines, Syzmanski and Churchill (1990) found that 
salespeople differ on the cues they utilize to classify customer prospects (e.g., into ideal, 
good, moderate, and poor prospects).  Syzmanski and Churchill further suggest 
programmatic research to examine the effects of cue dissimilarities on cue usage and 
salespeople’s customer selection. 
In response to Syzmanksi and Churchill’s research call, the present work seeks an 
explanation for when different cues are utilized in forming judgments in customer 
selection.  Previous work describes information cue taxonomies (e.g., Purohit and 
Srivastava 2002; Sujan 1985); however, still absent in the literature are explanations for 
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why individuals use different cues.  Prior research suggests that a person’s motivation, 
ability, and/or opportunity to process information may explain why individuals differ in 
their reliance on objective versus subjective information in judgment formation (Pham 
and Avnet 2004).  Pham (1998) found that judgments are more likely to be based on 
subjective affective cues, as opposed to objective cues, when the person has experiential 
motives (e.g., reading a novel to relax) than when the person has instrumental motives 
(e.g., reading a tax manual to prepare a tax return).  Pham and Avnet’s (2004) extension 
of this earlier work found support for individual differences in self-regulatory goal 
motivation (i.e., “ideal” goals versus “ought” goals, Higgins 1998) to explain why some 
individuals attended more to the substance of an advertisement, when others were 
persuaded more by subjective affective responses to an advertisement.     
The present work extends the cue diagnosticity perspective to investigate whether 
accounting for the decision-maker’s need for discretion will help explain when, and if, 
the customer’s reputation and/or customer quantitative information are diagnostic cues in 




To address the research questions above, this study adopts an experimental 
scenario design.  The variables for this study are based on a review of academic and 
mainstream literature as well as on the results of the qualitative interviews.  This study 
proposes that the effects of customer quantitative merit, customer reputation, and the 
decision-maker’s need for discretion influence customer selection likelihood.  
Furthermore, it is also proposed that accounting for the intervening effects of customer 
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risk assessment, attitude toward the customer, and perceived value of the customer will 
provide additional understanding of customer selection decisions.  The remainder of this 
section defines the study constructs and outlines the three-way interaction hypotheses 
with supporting theory and rationale. 
 
Customer Quantitative Merit and Customer Reputation 
 
Generally, individuals attempt to learn as much as they can prior to making a 
decision in new and ambiguous situations (Skinner 1995).  The ambiguous nature of 
customer selection is no exception.  Decision-makers rely on evaluative cues in deciding 
whether to accept or reject business from a customer.  Two sources of customer 
information were identified in the literature review and in qualitative research as 
influencing this decision.  First, customer quantitative merit refers to the extent to which 
quantitative calculations support the overall merit of the customer.  In banking, the 
financial or credit worthiness of the customer is measured using financial ratios (e.g., 
debt-to-income, net worth) and credit indices (e.g., Fair Isaac Corporation (FICO) score).  
Beyond its application in banking, the quantitative merit of the customer is also assessed 
in insurance (e.g., risk scores) and educational settings (e.g., standardized testing).  The 
prescribed application of customer quantitative merit information allows for little 
discretion since inputs into these ratios and indices are derived using math and 
computerized models.  Prior research describes this type of quantitative information as 
“hard” information (Berger et al. 2005).  Second, conceptualized as a “soft” measure of 
the quality of the customer, customer reputation is the global perception of the extent to 
which a customer is held in high esteem or regard (Weiss, Anderson, and Macinnis 
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1999).  This type of information is very discretionary since the characteristics of the 
individual evaluating it influence its assessment.  
Previous research in finance has explored the main effects of hard and soft cues 
on loan evaluation decisions.  Cole et al. (2004) reported anecdotal and empirical 
evidence that small and large banks utilize different information cues.  They found that 
for decisions regarding extending or denying credit to small business customers, large 
banks took a “cookie-cutter” approach and relied more on “hard” cues to prevent agency 
conflict and to maintain consistent loan standards and procedures than they did on “soft” 
or qualitative cues (e.g., reputation).  On the other hand, small banks relied more on 
“soft” cues.  Based on loan officers’ personal interactions with and assessment of loan 
applicants, small banks took a “character” approach or one that relied heavily upon pre-
existing relationships that provide insights into the character of the customer, and 
assigned less weight to formal financial data.  Carter and McNulty (2005) describe the 
differences between these two approaches, which result in a competitive advantage for 
small banks to do small business loans.  The research of Cole et al. and Carter and 
McNulty are important to the present work because they found that banks differ on 
whether they primarily rely on “hard” or “soft” measures in evaluating and forming loan 
judgments.  However, rather than focusing on the main effects of “hard” and “soft” cues 
at the bank-level, the present research investigates the joint influence of quantitative 
merit, reputation, and the decision-maker’s need for discretion on individual decisions 
regarding whether to accept or reject business from a customer. 
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Need for Discretion 
 
The next independent variable is the decision-maker’s need for discretion.  This 
variable was identified based on a review of the literature and qualitative interviews.  
Service delivery processes have been described along two dimensions – complexity and 
divergence (Shostack 1987).  Complexity refers to the intricacy of the script or steps 
required to perform a service, while divergence is the level of discretion allowed or 
inherent in service delivery (Kelley, Longfellow, and Malehorn 1996).  According to 
interviews with bank executives and loan officers, the role of the commercial loan officer 
is fairly flexible and open to discretionary judgment, and the loan officer’s willingness 
and ability to use discretion varies across loan officers.  These individual differences 
were most apparent when commercial loan officers faced situations in which approving a 
customer for a loan required an exception to bank policy.  Similar to other service 
contexts in which the seller must decide whether to accept business from a customer, the 
service delivery process of banks is complex in that bank employees follow prescribed 
steps to perform their jobs.  Such steps notwithstanding, circumstances do arise when 
loan officers have to decide whether to deviate from policy to approve a loan.  Whether a 
loan officer makes a policy exception is influenced by many contextual and individual 
factors, including how comfortable the loan officer feels operating “outside” bank policy.  
Therefore, the present work attempts to capture the individual differences in the enduring 
propensity of loan officers to seek autonomy from organizational norms when making 
loan decisions.  In addition to qualitative research, previous literature on discretion usage 
supports the notion that this individual difference variable is important in understanding 
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how customer contact personnel perform their jobs (Kelley, Longfellow, and Malehorn 
1996). 
Human motivation and decision-making processes are inherently linked to 
individual traits and goals (Chi 2001).  Chi (2001) suggests that accounting for how 
people prioritize goals, seek feedback, and regulate themselves will provide insight into 
how individual differences influence decision-makers’ cognitive processes.  Kelley, 
Longfellow, and Malehorn (1996) investigated the extent to which organizational 
support, formalization, and centralization influenced three types of discretionary 
behaviors among front-line employees—routine discretion, creative discretion, and 
deviant discretion.  They found that organizational support encouraged routine and 
creative discretionary behavior across samples of both bank employees and insurance 
agents.  They also reported that the level of organizational formalization inhibits deviant 
discretionary behavior among bank employees and insurance agents.  These authors also 
called for research to investigate whether the exercise of discretion might be a predictor 
of employee performance.  The present work proposes that an individual’s need for 
discretion, or in other words to what extent individuals follow the rules prescribed in their 
job, will influence an important performance behavior: how they decide to accept or 
reject business from a customer.   
Related research in organizational behavior has directed attention toward 
understanding the importance of process orientation (versus a results orientation) in 
organizational practice, and specifically how it relates to an employee’s behavior and 
psychological welfare (Hofstede et al. 1990; Verbeke 2000).  Conceptualized as one end 
of a continuum, with results orientation on the opposite end, process orientation is 
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defined as management’s desire for employees to engage in business processes that span 
several functions and departments.  It is the process-oriented organizational culture that 
reflects what Verbeke (2000, p. 591) describes as “employees strict and rigid adherence 
to their own responsibilities within those processes.” 
Singh, Verbeke, and Rhoads (1996) created configurations or archetypes based on 
five dimensions of organizational practices including the process-results orientation 
dimension.  They concluded, based on a study of customer contact personnel (i.e., 
customer service, salespeople) in a U.S. and Dutch multinational company, that a 
procedural-oriented environment was dysfunctional because it engendered higher levels 
of role stressors, reduced job performance and job satisfaction, and increased turnover 
intentions.  However, Singh and colleagues mentioned the following limitations to their 
study.  First, the procedural orientation archetype was created using cluster analysis and 
thus reflected not only the process-oriented dimension but other distinct organizational 
cultural dimensions (i.e., internal-oriented versus customer-oriented, open versus closed, 
employee versus job, organizational versus professional, loose versus tight).  Second, 
although the research of Singh and colleagues accounts for perceptions of the 
organizational environment, it does not account for how an individual’s process 
orientation influences that person’s perception of the organization’s process orientation.  
This raises the question of whether their results can be explained in part by the 
independent nature of the sample population of service workers and salespeople, who 
resent process-oriented work environments. 
Within the tradition of the 3M Model of Motivation and Personality developed by 
Mowen (2000), the current work proposes that the need for discretion is a situational trait.  
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The 3M model defines situational traits as enduring tendencies to express consistent 
patterns of behavior within a general situational context.  Other situational traits 
important in the organizational setting include job resourcefulness (Licata et al. 2003), 
results orientation (Harris 2001), and productivity orientation (Harris 2001).  Based on 
theoretical specification, the need for discretion as a personality trait does not refer to any 
particular behavior or set of behaviors, but instead reflects an internal motivation that 
drives the performance of such behaviors over time (Licata et al. 2003). 
 
Customer Selection Likelihood 
 
The central focus of this study is on predicting customer selection likelihood.  The 
remainder of this section is dedicated to defining this dependent variable and stating the 
theory-driven hypotheses. 
Customer selection likelihood refers to the perceived probability that the seller 
will accept business from a customer.  In the context of this study, customer selection 
likelihood is the probability that the loan officer will approve the customer for the loan.   
Individuals who determine whether to accept business from the customer look to 
customer-specific cues to help them appraise or evaluate the customer.  Two such cues 
are the quantitative merit and the reputation of the customer.  The present work advances 
the cue diagnosticity perspective by suggesting that individual differences in the need for 
discretion will influence how information is weighted.  According to the diagnosticity 
perspective, depending on the decision-maker’s need for discretion, either customer 
quantitative merit or customer reputation could serve as the diagnostic cue in making a 
customer judgment.  Because the need for discretion concentrates on following the rules 
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associated with the job, decision-makers with high-discretion needs are likely to weight 
more heavily the evaluative cue that affords the most flexibility in interpretation.  
Decision-makers with low discretion needs, however, will base their decision on the 
customer’s quantitative merit because this cue requires the least amount of discretionary 
interpretation.  Therefore, as it pertains to making a customer judgment, customer 
quantitative information is posited to be diagnostic for low-need-for-discretion (NFD) 
decision-makers, and customer reputation information will be diagnostic for high-NFD 
individuals.    
Based on this conceptual framework, three-way interaction hypotheses were 
developed for customer selection likelihood.  The predictions are derived from the 
following logic.  Low-NFD individuals focus on the quantitative merit of the customer as 
the diagnostic cue because it is precise and allows little room for discretion.  As a result, 
only quantitative merit will impact customer selection and the reputation of the customer 
will have no significant effect. 
High-NFD individuals will employ both cues, but the customer’s reputation will 
be the dominant cue.  When the customer’s reputation is positive, quantitative merit will 
have no effect on the dependent variable.  In contrast, when the customer’s reputation is 
negative, quantitative merit will influence the dependent variable in such a way that low- 
quantitative-merit will result in a lesser likelihood of customer selection.  Based on this 
logic, the following hypotheses are proposed.  Interaction plots for these hypotheses are 
















































Customer Quantitative Merit, Customer Reputation, and Need for Discretion 
on Customer Selection Likelihood (Hypotheses) 
 
H1:  There will be a three-way interaction between customer quantitative merit, 
customer reputation, and the decision-maker’s need for discretion on customer 
selection likelihood.
H2:  When the need for discretion is low, there will be a main effect for customer 
quantitative merit such that customer selection likelihood will be higher when 
customer quantitative merit is high rather than low. 
H3:  When the need for discretion is high, customer quantitative merit will 
interact with customer reputation.  (a) When customer reputation is positive, there 
will be no effect for customer quantitative merit.  (b) When customer reputation is 
negative, customer selection likelihood will be higher when customer quantitative 
merit is high rather than low. 
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In addition to customer selection likelihood, two other selection judgment 
variables were explored in this research-- magnitude of resource allocation and quality of 
the terms given to the customer.  No formal hypotheses are stated for these two 
dependent variables because it was anticipated that they would follow the same pattern of 




To the researcher’s knowledge, this is the first study to explore the individual 
decision-making process in customer selection.  In response to the research question to 
identify and test the intervening effects of “process” variables in customer selection, three 
variables were proposed to influence customer selection likelihood—customer risk 
assessment, attitude toward the customer, and the perceived value of the customer.  These 
variables were chosen based on the literature review and the qualitative interviews with 
bank executives and regulators.  The remainder of this section defines each variable, and 
describes its importance in the decision-making process of customer selection. 
Customer risk assessment refers to the decision-maker’s perception of the degree 
to which the individual customer presents a threat to the welfare of the firm.  Assessing 
the risk of the customer has been proposed as an important part of managing a customer 
portfolio (Ryals 2003).  Many companies assess the risk of the customer using some form 
of risk or credit scoring system.  Risk scoring is an effective way of evaluating specific 
types of risk in a customer relationship.  For example, banks attempt to assess the risk of 
loan default prior to making a loan decision.  It is proposed when deciding to accept or 
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reject business from a customer, decision-makers will first assess the risks associated 
with the customer’s request.    
Attitude toward the customer refers to the decision-maker’s overall evaluation of 
the customer.  Attitude toward the customer captures the decision-maker’s affective 
responses (i.e., like – dislike, favorable – unfavorable, good – bad) toward the customer.  
It is proposed that these affective responses will influence customer selection likelihood.  
To the author’s knowledge, this is the first study to consider how an employee’s attitude 
toward a specific customer influences his or her decision to do business with that 
customer.  
Perceived value of the customer refers to the customer’s contribution to the 
overall welfare of the firm.  Customer value is the central component in assessing 
customer profitability.  For example, firms may use the customer lifetime value (CLV) 
metric to predict the future profitability of the customer by accounting for purchase 
frequency, predicted contribution margin, customer retention, and the marketing 
resources allocated to the customer’s relationship (Venkatesan and Kumar 2004).  This 
research proposes that the subjectivity of inputs into perceptions of the value of a 
customer will influence the decision-maker’s behavioral intentions to accept or reject 
business from a customer.  Therefore, it is believed that the perceived value of the 





The following section outlines the methods used to test the hypotheses.  First, the 
process of developing the need for discretion (NFD) scale is outlined.  Second, the 
procedure for drafting and pre-testing the experimental scenario is discussed. Third, the 
experimental design and administration procedure is described.  Finally, the results of this 
study are discussed in response to the research questions.  
 
Scale Development:  Need for Discretion 
 
The scale development procedure outlined here follows the guidelines set forth by 
Churchill (1979) and Hinkin (1998).  Support for creating a NFD scale is based on a 
literature review and the qualitative interviews that suggest that defining and measuring 
this construct is worthwhile for theory-building and managerial practice. 
Following the guidelines of Churchill (1979), an initial set of items was developed 
(see Appendix A).  Items were both drafted and adapted from existing scales to reflect the 
underlying NFD construct supported by the review of the literature; the results of the 
qualitative interviews with bank executives, loan officers, and regulators; focus group 
sessions with bank executives and loan officers; and consultation with expert academic 
researchers. 
Following the domain sampling model for measurement developed by Nunnally 
(1967), nine items were initially drafted to measure the NFD construct.  This scale was 
administered in a survey to 178 MBA and undergraduate students with work experience 
in jobs that involved some degree of autonomy in decision-making.  In addition to the 
nine NFD items, other existing scales were administered to assess the discriminant 
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validity of the measure.  Prior to analysis, missing data were replaced via mean 
substitution. 
First, an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was conducted to assess the 
dimensionality of the measure.  The sample was randomly split into estimation and 
validation sub-samples.  The quality of the random split was determined to be adequate 
based on non-significant t-test comparisons and similar R-squared values.  The Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy (KMO-MSA) index for the items was 
assessed.  For both sub-samples, the KMO-MSA index was above .87, suggesting that the 
data sets were appropriate for an EFA.  Additionally, Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was 
significant in both sub-samples, indicating that the population correlation matrix was 
significantly different from zero (Hair et al. 1998).  For both sub-samples, EFA1 results 
revealed a two-factor solution where six of the nine items loaded on one factor with 
factor loadings greater than .80 and three other items had strong cross-loadings or clearly 
loaded on a second factor.  For both the estimation and validation sub-samples, the 
explained variance of the two-factor solution was above 68%.  The pattern of the two 
components was generally consistent across the two samples.  After closely examining 
three poorly performing items, the researcher concluded that confusion with item 
wording (e.g., negative wording) was likely influencing the response patterns on these 
three items.  At this stage of the analyses, the three items were retained.  A final EFA was 
estimated on the combined estimation and validation samples.  The results of this EFA 
confirmed earlier results, revealing a two-factor solution based on the “eigenvalue greater 
than one” rule.  The first factor explained 53% of the 65% of the variance in the data set.  
 
1 All the exploratory factor analyses reported used a principal component extraction method with promax 
rotation. 
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The pattern of the factor loadings was similar to that in earlier EFA runs where the 
second factor consisted of the same three items with problematic wording.  These items 
were dropped from future analyses. 
Second, a confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to assess the dimensionality 
of the NFD scale and to test for construct validity using LISREL 8.71 (Jöreskog and 
Sörbom 1996).  The first CFA model included the six items proposed to capture the NFD 
construct.  The six items were forced to load on a single factor.  The CFA results 
indicated that the NFD items loaded as predicted with minimal cross-loadings, providing 
evidence of unidimensionality (Gerbing and Anderson 1988).  For the NFD model, χ2 =
49.75 (degrees of freedom [d.f.] = 9, p < .001); goodness-of-fit index (GFI) = .91; 
normed fit index (NFI) = .96; nonnormed fit index (NNFI) = .94; and comparative fit 
index (CFI) = .962. Although the model fit of the six-item NFD scale followed published 
recommendations, CFA fit statistics suggested that further improvement to the scale was 
possible.  In addition to improving the fit of the scale, another aim was to reduce the 
scale’s length while maintaining its psychometric properties.  Following guidelines 
outlined by Voss, Spangenberg and Grohmann (2003), a series of shortened versions of 
the scale were compared using χ2 difference tests and goodness-of-fit indices (i.e., GFI 
and adjusted goodness-of-fit index (AGFI)).  Following decision rules outlined by Voss 
and colleagues, the researcher halted item removal iterations when one or both of two 
possible results occurred: (1) the χ2 difference tests showed no difference and/or (2) the 
AGFI did not increase.  The following describes the procedure for item removal.  First, 
one of the items of the six-item scale was dropped because its factor loading was 
 
2 As Bollen (1989) outlines, the χ2 test for CFAs has many limitations, and therefore even though the 
researcher presents the χ2 test, the researcher relied primarily on GFIs in assessing model adequacy. 
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considerably lower than the remaining five items.  Modification indices revealed that 
eliminating this item would have a significant improvement (i.e., reduction) on χ2.
Therefore, a second CFA model was assessed on the five remaining items.  For the five-
item NFD model, χ2 = 21.45 (d.f. = 5, p < .001); GFI = .95; NFI = .97; NNFI = .96; and 
CFI = .98.  The researcher then conducted a χ2 difference between the six item and the 
five item scales.  χ2 difference test results (χ2∆ = 28.30 [d.f. = 1, p < .001]) revealed that 
the five-item scale is a better fitting model than the six-item scale.  AGFI for the five-
item scale (.85) was higher than that for the six-item scale (.78).  The significant χ2
difference test and the increase in AGFI, taken together, support the five-item scale.  
However, modification indices did reveal that dropping an additional item might improve 
the fit of the scale.  The researcher elected to drop the item and reestimate the model and 
to compare this model to the five-item scale using the χ2 difference test and AGFI 
guidelines.  For the four-item NFD model, χ2 = 12.04 (d.f. = 2, p < .01); GFI = .96; AGFI 
= .82; NFI = .97; NNFI = .94; and CFI = .98.  Item removal iterations were discontinued 
because of the decrease in AGFI when estimating the four-item scale. 
Third, a coefficient alpha was calculated to measure the internal consistency of 
the NFD measure.  Alpha for the five-item scale was .91, and all item-to-total 
correlations were greater than .50. 
Construct validity refers to the face, convergent, discriminant, trait, and 
nomological validities of the new measure (Peter 1981).  Traditionally, convergent and 
discriminant validity have been assessed using the multitrait-multimethod matrix 
proposed by Campbell and Fiske (1959).  However, recent developments in structural 
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equation modeling (SEM) have provided additional methods for assessing convergent 
and discriminant validity. 
The variance-covariance matrix for the items comprising the need for discretion 
scale was used as input into SEM using Lisrel 8.70.  The results supported convergent 
validation of the measure with all items loading significantly on one factor with all t-
values greater than 12.0.  Furthermore, the fit indices were acceptable, χ2 = 21.45 (d.f. = 
5, p < .001); GFI = .95; NFI = .97; NNFI = .96; and CFI = .98.  Table 4-1 presents the 
factor loadings, item-to-total correlations, means, and t-values for each item of the scale.  




Factor Loading, Item-to-Total Correlations, Means, and  
T-Values for Need for Discretion Items 
 
Item Loading Item-to-Total Mean t-value 
1. In my job I follow strict operational 
procedures at all times. 
.78 .74 6.03 11.98 
2. I follow all the rules associated with 
my job. 
.84 .76 6.54 13.52 
3. I never make exceptions to policies 
and procedures in my job. 
.83 .81 5.25 13.30 
4. I pride myself on following rules and 
procedures with my job no matter 
what. 
.82 .83 5.61 13.00 
5. I believe it is better to never step out 
of policy to make things happen in 
my job. 
.84 .72 4.71 13.34 
(α = .91, Composite Reliability = .91, AVE = .68) 
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Discriminant validity was assessed for the NFD measure using guidelines outlined 
in the literature (Anderson and Gerbing 1988; Bagozzi, Yi, and Phillips 1991; Fornell and 
Larcker 1981).  This process involved comparing the NFD measure with another measure 
with which discriminant validity should be expected.  The measure used for these 
comparisons was a deviant discretion usage scale (Kelley, Longfellow, and Malehorn 
1996).  The purpose of this analysis was to support the theoretical assertion that the 
individual difference trait, NFD, does indeed differ from the behavioral outcome, deviant 
discretion usage (DDU).  First, the researcher estimated a single-factor model with the 
five items of the NFD scale loading on the same factor as the five items from DDU and 
compared the fit of the model with a two-factor model where the NFD items loaded on a 
separate factor from the DDU items.  If the two-factor model is superior, there should be 
a reduction in the χ2 statistic relative to the single-factor model.  The results of the χ2
difference test (χ2∆ = 154.91 [d.f. = 1, p < .0001]) revealed that, in fact, the two-factor 
model has vastly superior fit.  Because the NFD and DDU scales were correlated, another 
step was taken to ensure that construct correlations were less than unity (Anderson and 
Gerbing 1988; Bagozzi, Yi, and Phillips 1991).  The researcher fit a two-factor CFA 
model with the correlation between the two constructs fixed at 1.00 and found that the 
construct correlation was less than one (χ2∆ = 98.14 [d.f. = 1, p < .0001]).  Finally, the 
researcher compared the AVE of NFD with the squared correlation between the 
constructs, and AVE exceeded the squared correlation (Fornell and Larcker 1981).  
Taken together, these results suggest that when used to measure an individual’s tendency 
to seek autonomy from organizational norms when making decisions, NFD captures 
information different from the work behaviors captured by deviant discretion usage. 
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Experimental Case Scenario 
 
The researcher followed the guidelines from White, Varadarajan, and Dacin 
(2003) to compose a case scenario.  The first step was to identify a realistic situation 
where individual employees exercise discretionary judgment in selecting customers to 
receive a product offering.  Commercial lending was chosen as the setting for the 
scenario because of the significant amount of discretion commercial loan officers use 
when approving new loans, renewing existing lines of credit, and pricing the interest rate 
and fee terms for each loan.  The qualitative interviews and literature provided additional 
reasoning for selecting commercial lending as the context for the scenario. 
The second step was to draft a realistic and controlled case scenario.  A 
preliminary scenario using the appropriate industry language and loan criteria as 
described in the qualitative interviews was presented to academic researchers with 
experience and research expertise in banking.  Their feedback was incorporated into a 
revision of the scenario, which addressed concerns regarding the presentation of the loan 
scenario and the customer quantitative merit and customer reputation manipulations.  The 
revised case scenario was piloted in focus group interviews with commercial loan 
officers.  Nine loan officers participated in two different focus groups.  The researcher 
identified five objectives for the focus group sessions:  First, evaluate the plausibility and 
realism of the scenario; second, probe whether any important or necessary information 
had been left out of the scenario; third, consider whether the context of the scenario (e.g., 
warehouse purchase) was plausible across industries, banks, and loan officer expertise; 
fourth, determine how much time was needed to answer the questions on the survey 
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including reading and responding to items pertaining to the scenario; and fifth, probe 
what meaningful incentives might increase the likelihood of respondent participation. 
The following outlines the format followed for these focus groups.  Participants 
were selected from four banks from a Midwestern U.S. state.  Participants were recruited 
by telephone and were invited to a luncheon meeting.  The focus group sessions followed 
a one-hour format.  Participants were greeted and served a light lunch.  The moderator 
briefly introduced the participants and the research study.  One of four versions of a 
survey containing the scenario and important personality, organizational, and 
demographic variables was then administered to each participant.  The moderator noted 
the start and finish times of the participants.  The time required to complete the survey 
ranged from 20 to 25 minutes.  The researcher observed that while completing the 
scenario portion of the survey, participants flipped back and forth from the scenario to the 
questions that followed.  This observation resulted in a modification to the format of the 
survey so that the scenario and the questions appeared on adjacent pages in booklet form.   
Upon completion of the survey the moderator probed first, the plausibility and 
realism of the scenario; second, whether the information was comprehensible and 
sufficient for making a loan judgment; third, whether the warehouse context was 
universal across industries, banks, and the capabilities and expertise of loan officers; and 
finally, the amount of time required to complete the survey and possible incentives to 
offer survey participants.  The discussions with the focus groups yielded valuable insight 
into improving the case scenario.  The consensus among the participants was that the 
scenario was extremely plausible and similar to those experienced in their jobs, that 
describing the prospective borrower’s cash flow history should be added, that the 
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manipulation of the borrower’s credit score as a proxy for customer quantitative merit 
should be balanced to reflect low (i.e., 610) and high conditions (i.e., 690) while still 
falling within a range of questionable or ambiguous levels, and that the customer 
reputation manipulation should be modified to reflect specific attributes of the customer’s 
reputation – civic reputation (i.e., serves (refuses to serve) on the boards of many local 
charities) and professional reputation (i.e. no reports (numerous reports) of the borrower 
having serious disputes with his customers and employees).  Finally, an unexpected 
finding from these sessions was that the narrative format of the scenario was similar to 
the format that commercial loan officers use when drafting loan reports in their jobs.   
Based on the findings from the focus group sessions, the scenario was modified 
and the revised instrument was administered to two commercial loan officers for their 
review and feedback.  Their feedback confirmed that the scenario adequately reflected a 
plausible commercial loan request.  The final case scenarios (see Appendix B - E) profile 
one of four versions of a commercial loan customer with different combinations of 




An experimental study was designed to assess how real commercial loan officers 
evaluate customers and make decisions regarding customer selection.  As described 
earlier, the scenario for this study is based on a situation in commercial lending.  The 
sample population for this study consists of commercial loan officers.  Commercial 
lending was selected as the context of this study over other types of lending (e.g., 
consumer lending, primary and secondary residential mortgage) first because, higher 
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amounts of discretion are utilized in evaluating commercial loans and second because 
from a policy perspective, there are fewer compliance regulations for commercial loans.  
Support for this rationale was drawn from the qualitative interviews with bank 
executives, loan officers, and regulators.  The reminder of this section describes the 
complete methodology employed in this study, including the analytical techniques used 
to assess the research hypotheses. 
 
Sample and Data Collection 
 
Banks were selected using two lists: a list of alumni from the business school 
alumni at a large Midwestern university who were known to be serving in executive 
positions in banking and a list of bank officers who participated in continuing education 
sponsored by a large Midwestern university.  The researcher telephoned the individuals 
from both of the lists.  The researcher first introduced the study by emailing the bank 
contact person a one-page summary of the research purposes and procedures, and the 
benefits to the bank for participating (see Appendix F).  If the bank contact did not have 
the authority to accept or decline the invitation to participate, the researcher contacted the 
responsible executive directly or requested that the bank contact person forward the one-
page summary to that person.  Once permission was granted by the bank executive, the 
researcher requested a roster of all the bank’s commercial loan officers.  Once survey 
materials were prepared and ready for delivery or mailing, an email memorandum was 
sent by the bank executive to survey participants endorsing the project and encouraging 
their participation.  To reduce the time and effort required to draft a memo, the researcher 
provided the bank executive with a sample memorandum (see Appendix G).  Depending 
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on the preference of the bank, surveys were either mailed or delivered to each branch.  
Each questionnaire was labeled and delivered separately to each commercial loan officer.  
A postage-paid, business reply envelope was included with each survey.  The loan officer 
survey took approximately 20 minutes to complete.  (See Appendix H for a sample of the 
survey.) 
Surveys were either mailed or delivered to 328 loan officers in nine banks.  Two 
weeks after the initial delivery of the survey, a reminder email was sent to all loan 
officers in the sample.  A total of 262 surveys were completed and returned, an 80% 
response rate.  Less than 5% of the returned surveys had missing data.   
 
Characteristics of the Sample 
 
The sample for this study was the 262 loan officers currently working in 
commercial lending across nine banks with operations in five U.S. states who responded 
to the survey.  The average of total bank assets for the nine banks was 1.8 billion.  The 
range of total bank assets among the nine banks was 36.7 million to 7.5 billion, 
representing a wide spectrum of small, mid-size, and large community banks.   
Of the 262 respondents, 77% were male.  The average age of respondents was 
46.1 years. Their average loan portfolio size was $24.6 million and the average loan limit 
or loan authority of respondents was $221,000.  The average industry tenure for the 





A threat to the validity of the findings in any survey design is non-response bias 
(Pedhazur and Schmelkin 1991).  The primary concern of non-response bias is that the 
researcher may draw inferences based on the sample that responded to the survey, 
ignoring the possibility that such individuals may be different from those who chose not 
to respond to the survey. 
 For this study, the concern of non-response bias is whether the random 
assignment to the treatment conditions had any bearing on whether respondents were 
early or late respondents.  The method for assessing the possibility of non-response bias 
in this study is based on the assumption that those who responded late to the survey are 
similar to those who did not respond at all.  To test whether there were differences in the 
response patterns across the experimental conditions, a variable was coded based on 
whether respondents returned the survey prior to the email reminder (i.e., “early” 
respondents) or whether they returned the survey after the email reminder (i.e., “late” 
respondents).  Of the respondents that received a scenario with the low-quantitative-
merit-condition, 117 were early respondents and 20 were late respondents.  Of those that 
received the high condition, 113 were early respondents and 12 were late respondents.  
The Pearson chi-square test results (χ2 = 1.52, p < .22) revealed that the response pattern 
of early and late respondents did not differ across the treatment levels of customer 
quantitative merit.  The same procedure was followed for customer reputation.  Of those 
who received the negative reputation condition, 115 were early respondents and 19 were 
late respondents.  Of those that received the positive reputation condition, 115 were early 
respondents and 13 were late respondents.  The Pearson chi-square test results  
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(χ2 = .99, p < .32) revealed that the response pattern of early and late respondents did not 
differ across the treatment levels of customer reputation.  A similar procedure was 
followed for NFD; however, the response pattern was assessed across a median split of 
NFD.  Of those respondents in the high-level of NFD, 103 were early respondents and 17 
were late respondents.  Of those respondents in the low-level of NFD, 127 were early and 
15 were late respondents.  The Pearson chi-square test results (χ2 = .79, p < .38) revealed 
that the response pattern of early and late respondents did not differ across the median 
split of NFD.  Taken together, these results suggest that there were no differences in the 
response patterns across the treatment conditions, satisfying the concern about non-
response bias in reporting results based on this sample.   
 
Design and Measures 
 
This study employs a 2×2×2 between-subjects design.  The manipulated 
independent variables are customer quantitative merit and customer reputation.  
Customer quantitative merit was manipulated using the Fair Isaac Corporation credit 
(FICO) score, which is used across many industries (e.g., banking, insurance) to evaluate 
the credit history of the customer.  FICO scores range from 300 to 850, and a score of 
650 or higher is considered excellent by most lenders (Fair Isaac Corporation 2005; 
Forsman 2001).  Customer quantitative merit was manipulated across two levels, a high 
score (i.e., 690) and a low score (i.e., 610).  Since the focus of this study is on decisions 
within the “gray” or ambiguous range, the two scores were carefully selected to reflect 
this middle range of credit scores that commercial loan officers encounter in their job.  
Earlier versions of this manipulation included a high-level of 725, and a low-level of 625; 
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however, seasoned commercial loan officers in the focus groups expressed concerns that 
these two scores were not equally balanced.  Therefore, additional one-on-one interviews 
were conducted with commercial loan officers and based on recommendations from these 
officers and academic experts, the scores were restricted to the 600 range to minimize the 
perception that a score in the 700 range is disproportionaly higher than a score in the 600 
range.  The ambiguity associated with the range of these two levels is consistent with the 
steps taken by White, Varadarajan, and Dacin (2003) to draft an ambiguous decision 
scenario. 
 Customer reputation was manipulated across two levels (i.e., positive reputation 
and negative reputation).  Information regarding the prospective borrower’s civic and 
professional reputation was presented in the final paragraph of the scenario.  The positive 
condition included the following wording: “The prospective borrower serves on the 
boards of many local charities.  There have been no reports of the borrower having 
serious disputes with his customers and employees.  The prospective borrower is 
positively regarded by others in the community.”  The negative condition included the 
following statements.  “The prospective borrower has refused to serve on the boards of 
many local charities.  There have been numerous reports of the borrower having serious 
disputes with his customers and employees.  The prospective borrower is negatively 
regarded by others in the community.” The need for discretion was measured using the 
new scale and was included in the analysis as a blocking factor.
Each loan officer was given one of the four versions of the scenario embedded in 
a survey that included a variety of other items.  Loan officer subjects were randomly 
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assigned to one of the four treatment conditions.  An equal number of subjects was 
assigned to each of the four treatment groups. 
 Prior to reading the case scenario, the loan officers were given instructions which 
stated that each of them had lending power to approve loans up to $250,000 and that each 
loan officer was individually responsible for collecting each of the loans he or she 
approved.  The loan officers were then asked to imagine that they were reviewing a loan 
profile documenting a small-business loan request from their actual bank.  Then the loan 
officers were asked to carefully consider questions regarding this loan file. 
Items were either drafted or adapted from literature to measure the following 
dependent and intervening variables: customer selection likelihood, customer risk 
assessment, attitude toward the customer, and the perceived value of the customer.   
Customer selection likelihood was measured using a three-item scale.  
Respondents answered the first item of the scale (i.e., “How likely are you to approve this 
customer for this loan?”) using an eight-point scale anchored with ‘very unlikely - very 
likely.’  For the remaining two items of the scale (e.g., “I would definitely approve this 
customer for this loan.”) responses were given using an eight-point scale anchored with 
‘strongly disagree – strongly agree.’   
Customer risk assessment was measured using a three-item scale (e.g., “What is 
the level of risk to your bank in doing this loan?”).  Respondents were asked to indicate 
their responses on a nine-point scale anchored with ‘very low - very high.’   
Attitude toward the customer was assessed using four semantic differential items 
(i.e., good-bad, favorable-unfavorable, strong-weak, like-dislike).  The perceived value of 
the customer was measured using a three-item scale (e.g., “In the future this customer 
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will contribute additional profits to my bank that far exceed the costs.”).  Responses were 




A number of control variables were included on the survey.  First, it was 
anticipated that differences in banks’ adherence to policy and procedures might impact 
the results.  This variable was accounted for by measuring the loan officer’s perceptions 
of the extent to which the bank uses credit score and reputation in making loan decisions.  
Also measured and included in analyses was the bank’s procedural orientation.  Items 
were adapted from existing scales to measure this organizational personality variable. 
Based on the literature and theory, other variables were also measured and considered in 
the analyses: job self-efficacy, perceived control over the situation, decision confidence, 




Questions on the survey verified the magnitude of the manipulations for customer 
quantitative merit and customer reputation.  For customer quantitative merit, respondents 
were asked to rate on a nine-point scale “the customer’s credit score” (unfavorable - 
favorable).  For customer reputation, respondents were asked to rate on a nine-point scale 
“the overall reputation of the borrower in the community” (unfavorable - favorable).  
These manipulation checks were analyzed using simple t-test comparisons of the 







Prior to being administered to the commercial loan officer sample, the survey was 
pre-tested using a sample of 178 MBA and junior/senior-level undergraduate students at a 
large Midwestern U.S. university.  Responses from fourteen subjects were not included in 
the pretest sample, because these subjects did not have work experience and/or decision 
autonomy in their jobs.  The usable sample size for the pre-test was 164.   
 Because the student subjects for this pretest were unlikely to have experience 
evaluating commercial credit, the instructions were modified to, “please imagine that you 
are a commercial loan officer at a bank as you the read the following story and customer 
description.”  Subjects were then presented with a brief explanation of the factors and 
ranges of loan characteristics.  Following the narrative loan scenario, subjects responded 
to items measuring the key dependent variable (i.e. customer selection likelihood), 
intervening variables, manipulation checks, and other related control variables. 
 The effectiveness of the customer quantitative merit and customer reputation 
manipulations was assessed using the prescribed manipulation checks.  As expected, 
subjects rated the customer with a 690 credit score significantly more favorable (M =
6.41) than the customer with a 610 credit score (M = 5.41, t = -4.68, d.f. = 162, p < .001).  
Also as anticipated, the positive level of the customer’s reputation was perceived more 
favorably (M = 7.33) than the negative reputation level (M = 3.43, t = -13.96, d.f. = 161, 
p < .001).  As another test of the effectiveness of the manipulations, univariate analyses 
were conducted to assess the between-subjects effects of the experimental conditions on 
98
the manipulation checks.  As expected, when assessing the between-subjects effects of 
the perceptions of the customer’s credit score, quantitative merit had a significant main 
effect (F = 18.80, p < .001) and the main effect for customer reputation was not 
significant (F = .30, p < .59).  Furthermore, when testing the between-subjects effects of 
the perceptions of the customer’s reputation, customer reputation was significant (F =
185.79, p < .001) and quantitative merit was not significant (F = .54, p < .47).  Taken 
together, the manipulations for this data performed as the researcher expected.  Also, 
responses to the question related to the perceived purpose of the study suggested that no 




Prior to testing the research model using the data collected from the sample of 
commercial loan officers, the data was subjected to tests of the assumptions of the 
ANOVA framework.  The following section outlines the tests and results of the 
assumptions. 
 The research design of this study satisfies the ANOVA requirement of interval 
scaled dependent variables and categorical independent variables.  A median split was 
performed on the NFD scale to satisfy this requirement.  The normality of the error terms 
distribution was assessed using normal probability plots (Hair et al. 1998), that is, by 
plotting the standardized residuals along a diagonal line representing the normal 
distribution.  Satisfying the normality assumption, the line of the plotted error terms 
closely resembled the distribution diagonal.  Independence of error terms was assessed 
using the Durbin-Watson statistic.  The Durbin-Watson statistic was close to 2.0, 
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providing support that the observations are independent of one another.  Finally, the 
homoscedasticity assumption was tested using boxplots and Levene’s test. 
Homoscedasticity refers to the assumption that dependent variable(s) exhibit equal levels 
of variance across the range of the predictor variables (Hair et al. 1998).  For ANOVA, 
the focus becomes the equality of the variance/covariance matrices across the different 
groups of the nonmetric variables (Hair et al. 1998).  The boxplots and results of 
Levene’s test revealed a violation of this assumption (i.e., heteroscedasticity).  Following 
the recommendations of Hair et al. (1998) to remedy this assumption violation, the 
dependent variable (i.e., customer selection likelihood) was transformed.  Following 
guidelines in the literature for selecting a transformation, customer selection likelihood 
was transformed by taking the logarithm of the variable (Hair et al. 1998).  The results of 
Levene’s tests revealed that the transformation remedied the heteroscedasticity and that 
the data conformed to the homoscedasticity assumption.3
Measurement Model 
 
The measurement model of the scaled variables in this study, including the 
intervening effect variables, was examined using EFA, reliability tests, and CFA 
analytics.  First, separate EFAs were conducted for each of the measured scales to assess 
scale dimensionality. For NFD, EFA results revealed a single-factor solution where all 
five items of the NFD scale loaded on one factor with factor loadings greater than .80.  
 
3 Although a logarithm transformation was performed on customer selection likelihood, Hair et al. (1998) 
suggests that the researcher carefully consider the change in the interpretation of the variables. Since the 
transformation did not change the results of the a priori predictions, the results and corresponding statistics 
presented and discussed are for the non-transformed dependent variable. 
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The explained variance of the single factor solution was 71.2%.  The coefficient alpha for 
the five-item NFD scale was .89 and all item-to-total correlations were greater than .70. 
For customer selection likelihood, EFA results revealed a single-factor solution 
for the three-item scale.  The three factor loadings were greater than .90. The explained 
variance of the single factor solution was 86.2%.  The coefficient alpha was .92 and all 
item-to-total correlations were greater than .70. 
For customer risk assessment, EFA results revealed a single-factor solution for the 
three-item scale.  The three factor loadings were greater than .79.  The explained variance 
of the single factor solution was 72.8%.  The coefficient alpha was .81 and all item-to-
total correlations were greater than .50. 
For attitude toward the customer, EFA results revealed a single-factor solution for 
the four-item scale.  The four factor loadings were greater than .80.  The explained 
variance of the single factor solution was 78.2%.  The coefficient alpha was .91 and all 
item-to-total correlations were greater than .70. 
For the perceived value of the customer, EFA results revealed a single-factor 
solution for the three-item scale.  The three factor loadings were greater than .80.  The 
explained variance of the single factor solution was 79.3%.  The coefficient alpha was .86 
and all item-to-total correlations were greater than .65. 
 Next, a CFA model was estimated with the respective items measuring NFD, 
customer selection likelihood, customer risk assessment, attitude toward the customer, 
and perceived value of the customer loading on each of the separate latent constructs.  
The results of the model revealed acceptable model fit (χ2 = 439.58 (d.f. = 125, p < .001); 
GFI = .85; NFI = .94; NNFI = .94; and CFI = .95).  Table 4-2 presents the construct 
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measures and CFA factor loadings.  Composite reliability (CR) for each of the scales was 
greater than .80 and the average variance extracted (AVE) calculations for all the scales 




Construct Measures and CFA Factor Loadings 
 
Loadings 
Need for Discretion  
In my job I follow strict operational procedures at all times. .75 
I follow all the rules associated with my job. .76 
I never make exceptions to policies and procedures in my job. .82 
I pride myself on following rules and procedures with my job no matter what. .88 
I believe it is better to never step out of policy to make things happen in my job. .78 
Customer Selection Likelihood 
How likely are you to approve this customer for this loan? .85 
I would definitely approve this customer for this loan. .91 
Approving this loan demonstrates my good judgment. .87 
Customer Risk Assessment 
What is the level of risk to your bank in doing this loan? .66 
What is the likelihood that the bank is going to lose money on this loan? .89 
What is the likelihood that this customer will repay this loan? (R) .79 
Attitude toward the Customer 
Bad – Good .91 
Unfavorable – Favorable .93 
Weak – Strong .77 
Dislike – Like .76 
Perceived Value of the Customer  
Approving this customer for this loan will be extremely profitable for my bank. .86 
In the future this customer will contribute additional profits to my bank that far 
exceed the costs. 
.92 




Prior to testing the research hypotheses, the quality of the customer quantitative 
merit and customer reputation manipulations was assessed.  For customer quantitative 
merit, as expected, subjects rated the customer with a 690 credit score significantly more 
favorable (M = 5.86) than the customer with a 610 credit score (M = 2.72, t = -19.40, d.f. 
= 260, p < .001).  For customer reputation, as expected, the positive level of the 
customer’s reputation was perceived more favorably (M = 7.18) than the negative 
reputation level (M = 2.40, t = -36.65, d.f. = 260, p < .001).  As another test of the 
effectiveness of the manipulations, univariate analyses were conducted to assess the 
effects of the experimental treatments on the two manipulation checks.  As expected, 
when assessing the between-subjects effects of the perceptions of the customer’s credit 
score, quantitative merit had a significant main effect (F = 373.29, p < .001) and the main 
effect for customer reputation was not significant (F = 2.24, p < .14).  Furthermore, when 
testing the between-subjects effects of the perception of the customer’s reputation, 
customer reputation was significant (F = 1339.16, p < .001) and quantitative merit was 
not significant (F = .82, p < .36).  These results suggest that the manipulations of the 




A 2 (customer quantitative merit: high vs. low) × 2 (customer reputation: positive 
vs. negative) × 2 (need for discretion: high vs. low) between-subjects ANOVA was run 
with customer selection likelihood as the dependent variable.  Complete results of this 
ANOVA are found in Table 4-3.  The purpose of this first ANOVA was to test the three-
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way interaction of customer quantitative merit, customer reputation, and the decision-
maker’s need for discretion (NFD).  The results of the ANOVA reveal that the three-way 
interaction (F = 4.54, d.f. = 1, 261, p < .03) was significant, providing support for H1. To 
interpret the significant three-way interaction, a 2 (customer quantitative merit) × 2 
(customer reputation) ANOVA was calculated for both low-NFD individuals and high-
NFD individuals, and the group means were plotted (see Figure 4-2).  Complete ANOVA 















Customer Quantitative Merit (Quant) 16.32 1 9.83 .01 
Customer Reputation (Reput) 73.79 1 44.43 .001 
Need for Discretion (NFD) .001 1 .00 .99 
Quant × Reput 1.14 1 .69 .41 
Quant × NFD .12 1 .07 .79 
Reput × NFD 6.61 1 3.98 .05 
Quant × Reput × NFD 7.55 1 4.54 .03 









































ANOVA Results for Customer Selection Likelihood 
(High/Low Need for Discretion Groups)  
 
Group: Low Need for Discretion  
EFFECT SS df F-stat p-value 
Customer Quantitative Merit (Quant) 10.63 1 5.39 .02 
Customer Reputation (Reput) 20.04 1 10.17 .01 
Quant × Reput 1.56 1 .79 .38 
Error 272.04 138   
 










Customer Quantitative Merit (Quant) 6.23 1 4.83 .03 
Customer Reputation (Reput) 56.82 1 43.99 .001 
Quant × Reput 6.64 1 5.14 .03 
Error 149.83 116   
Figure 4-2 
 
Customer Quantitative Merit, Customer Reputation, and Need for Discretion 
on Customer Selection Likelihood (Results) 
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First, for low-NFD individuals, the results revealed a main effect for customer 
quantitative merit (F (1, 141) = 5.39, p < .02).  H2 proposed that for low-NFD decision- 
makers the diagnostic cue in making a customer selection decision would be customer 
quantitative merit information and that customer reputation information would not have a 
main effect on customer selection likelihood.  This prediction was based on the logic that 
low-NFD decision-makers, in an effort to seek congruence between their personality and 
cue preference, would rely on the cue that requires the least amount of discretionary 
judgment.  To support this prediction, ANOVA results would need to demonstrate a non-
significant two-way interaction between customer quantitative merit and customer 
reputation, a significant main effect for customer quantitative merit, and a non-significant 
main effect for customer reputation.  ANOVA results revealed that the customer 
quantitative merit × customer reputation interaction was not significant (F (1,141) = .79, 
p < .38).  Consistent with the prediction, the main effect for customer quantitative merit 
was significant (F (1, 141) = 5.39, p < .02).  Contrary to the prediction of H2 however, 
the main effect for customer reputation was significant (F (1, 141) = 10.17, p < .01).  The 
results of the main effect for customer reputation alone do not reveal whether the pattern 
of the main effect is consistent across low and high levels of quantitative merit.  A priori 
contrasts of the group means were calculated for each treatment combination.  Pairwise 
comparisons of the means of the low-quantitative-merit/positive-reputation group (M =
3.19) and the low-quantitative-merit/negative-reputation group (M = 2.23) were tested.  
The results of this contrast test revealed a significant mean difference (t = 2.87, p < .01)
for the two groups.  Next, the means for the high-quantitative-merit/positive-reputation 
group (M = 3.53) and the high-quantitative-merit/negative-reputation group (M = 2.99)
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were tested.  Contrast test results revealed no mean difference between these two groups 
(t = 1.63, p < .11).  Taken together, these findings provide partial support for H2. 
For high-NFD individuals, as expected, the two-way interaction of customer 
quantitative merit × customer reputation was significant (F (1, 119) = 5.14, p < .03).  H3a 
predicted that for high-NFD individuals, customer reputation would be the dominant cue 
when the information about the customer was positive.  In other words, positive 
information about the customer’s reputation would be the primary information used by 
high-NFD individuals to make a customer selection decision (Herr, Kardes, and Kim 
1991).  H3b predicted a different pattern of cue diagnosticity for high-NFD individuals as 
compared to low-NFD individuals.  H3b proposed that when negative, customer 
reputation would not be the dominant cue in assessing the likelihood of customer 
selection; instead, quantitative merit would be weighted more heavily than reputation.  
Planned comparisons were employed to test H3a and H3b.  First for H3a, the means of 
customer selection likelihood for the positive-reputation/low-quantitative-merit group   
(M = 3.22) and the positive reputation/high-quantitative-merit group (M = 4.16) were 
compared.  Contrary to the prediction made in H3a, pairwise comparisons revealed a 
significant difference in the means of customer selection likelihood for these two groups 
(t = 2.97, p < .01).  For H3b, the means of customer selection likelihood for the negative- 
reputation/low-quantitative-merit group (M = 2.30) and the negative reputation/high- 
quantitative-merit group (M = 2.28) were compared.  Contrary to the prediction in H3b, 
pairwise comparisons of the mean difference in customer selection likelihood for these 
two groups was not significant (t = -.05, p < .96).  Taken together, these results provide 
partial support the predictions made in H3a or H3b.   
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An ANOVA was also conducted for each of the two additional dependent 
variables – the magnitude of resource allocation and the quality of the loan terms.  It was 
believed that the patterns of results for these two variables would resemble those of 
customer selection likelihood.  Results of these analyses revealed main effects for 
customer quantitative merit and customer reputation on both magnitude of resources 
allocation and the quality of the loan terms.  The three-way interactions, however, were 
not significant.  
In summary, the results of the ANOVA and planned comparisons across low-
NFD and high-NFD conditions provide some evidence that accounting for the 
individual’s chronic need for discretion explains differences in information diagnosticity 
in customer selection decisions.  Generally consistent with the predictions derived from 
the cue diagnosticity perspective, quantitative merit information was highly diagnostic 
for low-NFD decision-makers and customer reputation information was highly diagnostic 
for high-NFD decision-makers.  Further examination of the group means, however, 
provides an additional interpretation of the three-way interaction.  The planned 
comparisons and plots of the group means for the customer reputation × NFD interaction 
reveals insights about the information preferences of low-NFD and high-NFD individuals 
(see Figure 4-3).  First, in the low-quantitative-merit condition (i.e., 610 FICO score), 
there was only a reputation effect; in other words, there was no mean difference when 
customer reputation was negative or positive among low- and high-NFD individuals.  
When customer reputation information was negative, the mean difference between high-
NFD individuals (M = 2.30) and low-NFD individuals (M = 2.23) was not significant (p <































































between high-NFD individuals (M = 3.22) and low-NFD individuals (M = 3.19) was not 
significant (p < .94).  In the high-quantitative-merit condition, however, customer 
reputation information has a strong influence on high-NFD individuals, and no influence 
on low-NFD individuals.  In other words, when quantitative merit is high, the mean 
difference between negative and positive customer reputation for high-NFD individuals 
(p < .001) was significant, and for low-NFD individuals (p < .10) was not significant.  
Taken together, these results suggest that when customer quantitative information is high, 
the high-NFD loan officer is more likely to approve the loan when the customer’s 
reputation is positive and reject the loan when the customer’s reputation is negative, 
whereas the low-NFD loan officer’s decision is not influenced at all by the customer’s 
reputation.  Plausible explanations for these results are discussed in the final section of 




Customer Reputation × Need for Discretion  





ANCOVA analyses were conducted to assess whether situational, individual, and 
demographic control variables influence the three-way interaction.  The situational 
variables included the loan officers’ perceptions of (1) the importance of credit score to 
their bank, (2) the importance of reputation, (3) their bank’s adherence to policy and 
procedures, (4) control over the situation, and (5) confidence in their decision.  Individual 
differences in self-efficacy on the job were analyzed.  Finally, industry tenure, loan 
portfolio size, and bank size were the demographic control variables analyzed. 
 Each of the control variables was included as a covariate in separate ANCOVA 
runs.  The primary focus of each of the ANCOVA models was to determine the impact of 
the covariate on the three-way interaction.  F-tests, p-values, and interaction plots were 
used to interpret the influence of the control variables.   
For the situational variables, the results revealed that the loan officer’s 
perceptions of the importance of reputation (F (1, 260) = 3.88, p < .05), control over the 
situation (F (1, 259) = 23.95, p < .0001), and decision confidence (F (1, 260) = 11.22, p <
.001) influenced customer selection likelihood.  The loan officer’s perceptions of the 
importance of credit score (F (1, 260) = .94, p < .33), and their bank’s adherence to 
policy and procedures (F (1, 261) = .25, p < .62) were not significant predictors.  
Accounting for the variance in customer selection likelihood stemming from these 
variables had little significant impact on tests and patterns of the three-way interaction.  
Only in the case of loan officer decision confidence was there an identifiable difference 
in the three-way interaction, and in that case the F-statistic and p-value were slightly 
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diminished (F (1, 260) = 3.64, p < .06) and the overall pattern of the interaction plot 
remained the same. 
Next, job self-efficacy (F (1, 260) = .43, p < .52), loan officer industry tenure (F
(1, 260) = 1.35, p < .25), and loan officer portfolio size (F (1, 248) = .75, p < .39) were 
analyzed as covariates.  Results reveal that none of these variables predicted customer 
selection likelihood, nor did they impact the nature of the three-way interaction.   
 
Intervening Effects Tests 
 
It was proposed that customer risk assessment, attitude toward the customer, and 
the perceived value of the customer would influence customer selection likelihood.  The 
following section describes the tests of these variables. 
 ANCOVA analyses were calculated for each of the three variables to test for main 
effects and mediating effects of these variables.  First, a 2×2×2 ANCOVA for customer 
selection likelihood was calculated with attitude toward the customer as the covariate.  
Results revealed a significant main effect for attitude toward the customer (F (1, 252) = 
69.89, p < .0001).  The three-way interaction was also significant (p < .03) and the 
pattern of the plotted interaction was unchanged.  Taken together these results suggest 
that attitude toward the customer does not mediate the effects of the three-way interaction 
on customer selection likelihood. 
Second, a 2×2×2 ANCOVA for customer selection likelihood was calculated with 
customer risk assessment as the covariate.  Results revealed a significant main effect for 
customer risk assessment (F (1, 260) = 100.01, p < .0001).  The three-way interaction 
was slightly affected (p < .11); however, the pattern of the plotted group means remained 
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the same.  Because of the change in the p-value of the three-way interaction, further 
analyses were conducted to investigate the possibility of mediation.  A 2×2×2 ANOVA 
was calculated for customer risk assessment.  Results reveal that the three-way 
interaction was not significant (p < .20).  Together these results suggest that customer risk 
assessment does not mediate the effects of the three-way interaction on customer 
selection likelihood. 
Lastly, a 2×2×2 ANCOVA for customer selection likelihood was calculated with 
perceived value of the customer as the covariate.  Results revealed a main effect for 
perceived value of the customer (F (1, 261) = 216.90, p < .0001).  The three-way 
interaction again was slightly affected (p < .15) and the plotted interaction resembled the 
same pattern.  Because of the change in the p-value of the three-way interaction, further 
analyses were conducted to investigate mediating effects.  A 2×2×2 ANOVA was 
calculated for perceived value of the customer.  Results revealed that the three-way 
interaction was not significant (p < .12).  Together these findings suggest that perceived 
value of the customer does not mediate the effects of the three-way interaction on 




An experimental design was employed to answer research questions #3 and #4.  A 
measure of the individual’s chronic need for discretion (NFD) was introduced and 
guidelines were followed to validate the NFD scale.  Exploratory factor, reliability, and 
confirmatory factor analyses were applied to data collected from a sample of MBA and 
undergraduate students with at least two years of work experience.  The prediction of the 
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three-way interaction of customer quantitative merit, customer reputation, and the 
decision-maker’s NFD was derived using the cue diagnosticity perspective.  Cue 
diagnosticity proposes that multiple cues combine in forming judgments, but that one of 
the cues might be weighted more heavily than other cues when forming a judgment.  This 
research proposed that low- and high-NFD individuals would rely on different cues when 
forming a customer-selection decision.  Research hypotheses were tested using data from 
a sample of commercial loan officers (N = 262).  As predicted, the results of a 2 
(customer quantitative merit: high and low)× 2 (customer reputation: positive and 
negative)×2 (NFD: high and low) ANOVA on customer selection likelihood revealed a 
significant three-way interaction.  For low-NFD individuals, it was proposed that 
customer quantitative merit information would be diagnostic for a likelihood of customer 
selection judgment because it is the piece of information that requires the least amount of 
discretionary judgment.  As predicted, the results of a 2 (customer quantitative merit) × 2 
(customer reputation) ANOVA on customer selection likelihood for the low-NFD group 
revealed a main effect for quantitative merit on customer selection likelihood.  In an 
unexpected finding, however, the main effect of reputation on customer selection 
likelihood was also significant.  These results, together with results of pairwise 
comparisons of the group means, provide partial support for the prediction that customer 
quantitative merit information is diagnostic for low-NFD individuals.  For high-NFD 
individuals, it was proposed that customer reputation information would be diagnostic 
when reputation was positive, but that when customer reputation information was 
negative, customer quantitative merit would be diagnostic.  Contrary to this prediction, 
the results revealed a different pattern of the customer quantitative merit× customer 
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reputation interaction for high-NFD individuals.  That is, when customer reputation 
information was negative, customer quantitative merit information did not influence 
customer selection for high-NFD individuals.  When customer reputation was positive, 
customer quantitative merit did influence customer selection decisions, such that when 
the customer’s credit score was higher, so too was the likelihood of customer selection.  
In summary, the difference between the hypothesis and these empirical results is that 
customer reputation information is diagnostic for high-NFD when customer reputation is 
negative instead of when it is positive.   
 An alternative perspective into these results was found when plotting the 
customer reputation × NFD interaction for low-quantitative-merit and high-quantitative 
merit-treatment conditions.  For the low-quantitative-merit conditions, the results 
revealed a main effect for customer reputation and no main effect for NFD.  In other 
words, there was only a reputation effect and it did not differ for high- and low-NFD 
decision-makers.  This result might be explained using the logic of “floor effects.”  That 
is, the 610 credit score used to manipulate the low-quantitative-merit condition is close to 
bank guidelines for the minimum standard for acceptable credit scores.  The nearer to the 
minimum standard or “floor,” the more concrete or automatic the decision is to reject the 
loan for both low- and high-NFD individuals.  There is no “floor effect” for customer 
reputation because there are no concrete guidelines for evaluating this customer factor.  
Based on this logic, it should be expected that differences among low- and high-NFD 
individuals in their weighting of customer reputation information would be more 
apparent when the customer’s credit score is farther removed from the “floor” imposed 
by bank standards.  The results of the customer reputation × NFD interaction for the high-
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quantitative-merit condition support this logic.  In the high-quantitative-merit condition, 
customer reputation, both in positive and negative forms, greatly influences the 
likelihood of customer selection for high-NFD individuals.  Under the same conditions, 
customer reputation has no influence on low-NFD individuals.  
Taken alone, the cue diagnosticity perspective does not explain these findings.  
An alternative theoretical explanation for these findings may be the dual-processing 
models of persuasion (e.g., ELM model, Heuristic-Systematic Model).  The argument for 
this theory’s premise is that the low-quantitative-merit condition results in a low-
involvement task because the decision to reject the loan is more automatic when the 
customer’s credit score is nearer to the bank’s minimum standard for acceptable credit 
scores.  On the other hand, the high-quantitative-merit condition results in a high-
involvement task because the decision to approve a loan is less automatic since there are 
no guidelines for approving customers with a higher credit score, and to justify approving 
loans, loan officers will scrutinize the customer’s credit score and other information (e.g., 
customer reputation/character).  Because of this increased cognitive processing of 
information in the more highly involved, high-quantitative-merit condition, it is likely 
that individual differences in NFD will influence the extent to which the peripheral 
customer reputation information affects customer selection likelihood.  Subjecting this 
alternative theory explanation to an empirical test is beyond the scope of the current 
project; however, future research should develop and test predictions of customer 
selection decision-making using information processing models.  These and other 
directions for testing theory-based hypotheses of customer selection are noted in the 
future research discussion of the following chapter.       
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The final research question sought to explore the intervening effects of customer 
risk assessment, attitude toward the customer, and perceived value of the customer on 
customer selection likelihood.  ANCOVA results revealed that all of these variables were 
significant predictors of customer selection likelihood.  Additional testing found that 





DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Chapter V contains a discussion and synthesis of the findings of this research and 
of the implications of the findings.  The chapter concludes with potential limitations of 
the research, an agenda for future research, and a general conclusion. 
 
Overview of Dissertation 
 
To the author’s knowledge, this dissertation represents the first work to explore 
how situational factors and personality interact to influence individual decisions to accept 
or reject business from a customer.  More specifically, this research is the first attempt to 
test whether differences in an individual’s chronic need for discretion influence how 
different types of information are processed in forming a customer selection judgment.  
This dissertation employed two methods – in-depth interviews and experimental data – to 
address four research questions: 
1. What quantitative and subjective factors influence customer selection 
decisions in the bank lending industry? 
 
2. What influence do loan officers have on customer selection judgments? 
 
3. What are the joint effects of customer quantitative merit, customer reputation, 
and the decision-maker’s need for discretion on customer selection 
likelihood?
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4. What are the intervening effects of customer risk assessment, attitude toward 
the customer, and perceived value of the customer on customer selection 
likelihood. 
 
Research questions 1 and 2 were addressed using a qualitative methodology. 
Research questions 3 and 4 were addressed using an experiment.  A discussion of the 




The Qualitative Study 
 
A qualitative study (i.e., Study 1) was employed to answer the first two research 
questions.  Sixteen in-depth interviews with bank executives and loan officers and five 
interviews with state and federal bank examiners and regulators were conducted.  
Interpretation of interviews revealed four themes central to customer evaluation and 
selection practices in banking: the different types and interpretations of information used 
in customer evaluation, the role of economic conditions on loan decisions, the loan 
officer’s role in loan decisions, and the impact of bank regulations on customer selection 
practices.    
Theme 1 suggested that loan officers rely on various types of information when 
making a loan decision.  Bank executive and loan officer informants discussed using 
information that is both quantitative, or precise, and information that is subjective, or 
open to individual interpretation.  When discussing the importance of a prospective 
borrower’s character, informants provided a number of examples where information 
pertaining to the borrower’s reputation was used to assess the individual’s character.  
Emerging from these interviews was evidence of individual differences among bank 
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officers in their chronic need to use discretion when evaluating customer loan requests.  
Two groups of bank officers were represented.  One group discussed loan decision-
making practices that strictly followed bank policy and guidelines.  A second group of 
bank officers discussed loan decision-making practices that embody individual 
interpretation or discretion and flexibility in making exceptions to bank policy and 
guidelines.  Based on this important finding, an experimental study was developed to test 
whether individuals with different levels of a chronic need for discretion weight 
quantitative information and customer reputation information differently when forming a 
customer selection judgment.  
Theme 2 suggested that economic conditions influence the loan evaluation 
process.  Based on the interviews, the economic environment influences bank customers 
selection practices at the bank level with adjustments to the guidelines enforced for the 
customer’s quantitative information (e.g., credit score, loan-to-value ratio).  Economic 
conditions also influence bank customer selection practices at the loan officer level.  
Loan officer informants discussed how individuals’ perceptions of economic conditions 
influence the extent to which they impose additional requirements on loan customers to 
be credit worthy.   
Theme 3 suggested that the job description of loan officers permits individual 
decision-making in customer selection.  Contrasted to other bank employee job 
descriptions, the role of commercial loan officers involves more decision autonomy.  This 
autonomy is translated into loan officers’ managing a loan profile where loan decisions 
can be made within a lending limit or a loan authority.  Commercial loan officers also 
influence loan decisions through their research on the borrower, their preparation of a 
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loan presentation, and their professional approach to presenting the loan file to a bank 
loan committee or supervising authority. 
The final theme (Theme 4) emerging was that the loan evaluation and decision 
process is largely influenced by the extent to which federal and state bank examiners 
enforce bank regulations.  This conclusion was drawn from discussions among 
informants on the differences in regulation enforcement in small community banks versus 
larger regional banks.  Informants from the larger banks described bank examinations 
that were more intensive and covered a broader review of bank records than did 
examinations of their smaller counterparts.  Follow-up interviews with federal and state 
examiners probed more extensively into the differences in the approaches and guidelines 
followed by examiners when reviewing files of different bank products (e.g., consumer 
loans vs. business loans) and examining different categories of banks (e.g. community 
banks vs. national banks).  These interviews provided insights into important policy 
issues pertaining to customer selection in the banking industry.  One of the important 
policy issues emerging from these interviews was that state and federal consumer 
compliance regulations are not enforced on bank products offered to small business 
customers.  The general consensus among these informants was that the consumer 
compliance regulations were enacted to protect customers who could not protect 
themselves from discrimination based on the customer’s race, color, religion, national 
origin, sex, marital status, and age.  This raises the question of whether small business 
owners have the ability to protect themselves.  The vulnerability of small business 
customers, along with limited resources to protect their own interests, raises the question 
of whether these disadvantages result in exploitation of or discrimination toward these 
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customers.  The managerial and policy implications of these findings will be discussed in 
a later section, especially as they pertain to the vulnerability of small business owners 
seeking financing from banking institutions.    
 
The Experimental Study 
 
An experimental study (i.e., Study 2) was conducted to address research questions 
three and four.  The results of Study 1 were used to develop the experimental design and 
the experimental scenario.  The experiment investigated the joint effects of customer 
quantitative information, customer reputation information, and the decision-maker’s need 
for discretion on individual decisions to accept or reject business from a customer.  
Hypotheses were proposed for a three-way interaction involving customer quantitative 
merit, customer reputation, and the decision-maker’s need for discretion on the decision- 
maker’s behavioral intentions to accept or reject business from a customer (i.e., customer 
selection likelihood).  Hypotheses were tested using responses to an experimental 
scenario about a fictitious small business customer’s loan request.  Customer quantitative 
merit was manipulated in the scenario using two levels (i.e., high – low) of the 
customer’s FICO credit score.  Customer reputation was manipulated in the scenario 
using statements describing the civic and professional reputation of the small business 
customer.  The experimental scenario was embedded in a survey containing measured 
variables, including the newly validated measure of the need for discretion (NFD), and 
the key dependent variable, customer selection likelihood.   
The survey was delivered to 328 commercial loan officers across nine community 
banks.  Completed surveys were returned by 262 loan officers (80% response).  The high 
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response rate is attributed to measures taken by the researcher to develop a partnership 
with each of the banks, including gaining the endorsement of a senior bank executive.  
Incentives were also given to reward loan officer participation, including a humanitarian 
donation (i.e., $2.00 donated to a hurricane relief fund for each survey completed) and a 
summary of the research results. 
ANOVA results supported the omnibus three-way interaction hypothesis.  The 
pattern of the interaction, however, was different from the prediction derived from the 
cue diagnosticity perspective.  It was proposed that the customer quantitative merit 
information and customer reputation information cues would influence the formation of 
customer selection likelihood judgments.  This research sought to extend the cue 
diagnosticity perspective by proposing that accounting for the loan officer’s need for 
discretion (NFD) would explain under what conditions quantitative information or 
reputation information is the dominant piece of information for deciding whether to 
approve or reject a customer’s loan request.  For low-NFD individuals, it was proposed 
that customer quantitative merit would be the dominant information cue. The results 
supported this hypothesis.  For high-NFD individuals, the prediction was that customer 
reputation would be the dominant information cue and that quantitative merit would not 
matter when the customer’s reputation was positive.  When the customer’s reputation was 
negative, however, quantitative merit would be diagnostic.  The results, however, 
revealed an opposite effect.  That is, when customer reputation was negative, customer 
quantitative merit did not matter.  When reputation was positive, quantitative merit 
information mattered, as supported by the finding that customer selection likelihood was 
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significantly greater in the high-quantitative-merit condition than in the low-quantitative- 
merit condition.   
 Taking an alternative perspective to the three-way interaction can provide 
additional insight into the behavioral tendencies of low- and high-NFD decision-makers.  
The customer reputation × NFD interaction was plotted for the low-quantitative-merit 
and high-quantitative-merit treatment conditions.  These plots revealed an interesting 
pattern.  When quantitative merit was low, there was a main effect for customer 
reputation and no effect for NFD.  This suggests that for evaluation of a customer with a 
credit score at the lower end of the acceptable range, NFD did not influence the use of 
reputation information.  Thus, when the customer’s reputation was negative, the 
likelihood of customer selection was much lower than when the customer’s reputation 
was positive, and NFD did not moderate the effect.  This finding may be the result of a 
“floor effect.”  That is, the lower credit score is nearer to the minimum acceptable 
standard for bank scores, which makes a rejection decision virtually automatic for both 
low- and high-NFD loan officers.  In contrast, when quantitative merit was high, low- 
and high-NFD individuals did differ in the extent to which reputation influenced 
customer selection likelihood.  That is, when the customer’s credit score was higher, 
NFD moderated the impact of customer reputation, such that customer reputation 
mattered for high-NFD individuals and did not matter for low-NFD individuals.  The 
possibility that there is a “floor effect” for credit score provides an alternative explanation 
for these results.  The “floor effect” for credit score is caused by bank policy and 
guidelines to reject loans with low credit scores.  However, there is no “ceiling effect” for 
accepting loans with high credit scores.  In other words, the decision to reject a customer 
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with a low credit score is a more automatic decision than the decision to approve a 
customer with a high credit score.   
This post-hoc explanation may be supported theoretically using the dual-
processing theories (e.g., elaboration likelihood model, heuristic-systematic model).  
Based on the tenets of these theories, the low-quantitative-merit-condition may be a low-
involvement situation where rejecting the loan is a more automatic decision.  As a result, 
reputation is used as a peripheral or heuristic cue to influence the selection judgment.  In 
contrast, high-quantitative-merit-conditions may place respondents in a high-involvement 
state that results in more extensive systematic information processing.  As a result, 
individual differences become salient and moderate the extant to which customer 
reputation influences the loan decision.  Future directions to empirically test hypotheses 
derived from the dual-processing theories are discussed in the future research discussion. 
ANCOVA analyses were also conducted to control for situational, demographic, 
and individual trait variables.  The results revealed that the loan officer’s perceptions of 
the importance of reputation, control over the situation, and decision confidence were 
significant predictors of customer selection likelihood.  However, the loan officer’s 
perceptions of the importance of credit score, the bank’s adherence to policy and 
procedures, job self-efficacy, industry tenure, and loan portfolio size did not have a 
significant influence on customer selection likelihood. 
A separate set of ANCOVA analyses was conducted in an exploratory manner to 
test the impact of customer risk assessment, attitude toward the customer, and the 
perceived value of the customer on customer selection likelihood.  ANCOVA results 
revealed that all three were strong predictors of customer selection likelihood; however, 
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none of the variables mediated the effects of the three-way interaction on customer 
selection likelihood.  These results suggest that customer selection likelihood ratings are 
fundamentally different from customer risk assessment, attitude toward the customer, and 




This research has a number of implications for managers.  First, individual 
differences in the need for discretion influence how employees process different types of 
information when making a customer selection decision-- particularly when the 
customer’s quantitative information is high enough that it does not lead to an automatic 
rejection judgment.  Managers should be aware of these behavioral tendencies to assist 
them in managing their customer portfolio.  When the quantitative information of the 
customer is more ambiguous and the employee’s decision requires additional information 
processing, high-NFD individuals may be more attune to making a customer selection 
decision based on the customer’s reputation, whereas low-NFD individuals appear to 
weight their decision on the customer’s quantitative information.  Managers should 
consider these tendencies when training and monitoring employees who make customer 
selection decisions.  These ideas suggest that formalized training should be considered 
for new employees in job roles that involve decision-making autonomy in customer 
selection decisions.  The objectives of such training may: (1) help employees recognize 
their unique level of need for discretion, and (2) demonstrate the individual and firm-
level consequences of these individual tendencies in customer selection.  Upon 
completing a formalized training program, managers should ensure that on-going training 
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and education are conducted with each employee to monitor changes in the employee’s 
need for discretion and behavioral patterns in evaluating customers.   
 Second, managers should clarify organizational norms and guidelines for how 
quantitative and reputation information are to be used when making customer selection 
decisions.  Managers should clearly communicate to employees the organization’s 
perspective and standards for customer quantitative information.  Managers need to also 
address policies for making exceptions to these rules.   
Third, managers need to examine the possibility of their organization’s adopting 
standards for how and to what extent employees should evaluate a customer’s reputation.  
Managers must also give careful consideration to any measure to standardize customer 
selection to prevent such steps from becoming discriminatory practice.  These and other 




In addition to implications for managers, this research raises some important 
public policy issues in customer selection practices.  The results of qualitative interviews 
with federal and state bank examiners suggest that commercial customers are not 
protected under federal and state consumer compliance regulations.  This finding raises 
the question of whether some classes of commercial customers (e.g., small business 
customers) are particularly vulnerable to bank customer selection practices.  This finding 
has important implications for policy makers as they consider ways of promoting small 
business growth.  Future research should explore whether the lack of consumer protection 
of small business customers hinders these growth initiatives.  Findings from the 
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qualitative interviews also raise questions regarding differences in the enforcement and 
interpretation of customer acquisition policies across different categories of banks (e.g., 
small banks versus large banks, community banks versus national banks).  Policy-makers 
should consider whether these differences have detrimental consequences on markets and 




There are limitations with this research.  One limitation is the generalizibility of 
these findings.  The current work tested a model of key factors influencing customer 
selection decisions in a small commercial banking context.  The experimental scenario 
involved a business owner, not a company guaranteeing repayment of the loan.  The 
scope of commercial lending situations involving an individual loan guarantor limits the 
generaliziblity of these findings across all commercial banking contexts.  Future work 
might consider whether behavioral tendencies exist in evaluating the quantitative merit 
and reputation of borrowing companies.  In addition, future research should strive to 
replicate the three-way interaction of customer quantitative merit, customer reputation, 
and the decision-maker’s need for discretion in other seller-choice decision contexts (e.g., 
insurance, education, healthcare).   
 Another limitation of this research is that loan officers evaluated a fictitious 
scenario involving a prospective borrower.  Future research should strive to replicate the 
findings having loan officers report on loan decisions based on actual customer requests.  
Loan officers could then provide a direct measure into the actual customer’s quantitative 
merit and reputation.  Such an effort to measure actual loan decisions might address 
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another possible limitation of this work, which is that responses to the customer selection 
likelihood scale items were for the most part below the scale’s midpoint, possibly 
because of conservatism among sample respondents evaluating the information in the 
scenario.  Another factor that might explain this response pattern is that the information 
(held constant across the four versions of the experimental scenario) pertaining to the 
customer’s cash flow was inadequate, causing respondents to be conservative in their 
evaluation and likelihood judgment.  
 It should also be noted that loan officer data was obtained at one point in time.  It 
is possible that a portion of the results may be attributed to the common method variance 
problem.  It is possible that the self-report items for the need for discretion may have 
affected how loan officers evaluated and responded to questions about the customer 
scenario.  The survey was organized so that items assessing the individual’s NFD were 
collected early in the survey and the experimental scenario was presented much later in 
the survey.  However, ideally, the items measuring the NFD would have been 




The implications and limitations of this work provide a number of ideas for future 
research.  The first research direction should seek to replicate these findings using actual 
customer loan decisions.  Also, future work should test the effects of the three-way 
interaction on customer selection practices in other seller-choice decision contexts.  
These relationships could be tested in a number of other seller-choice decision contexts.  
For example, future work should explore the effects of customer quantitative merit and 
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customer reputation information on customer selection practices in the insurance, 
healthcare, and educational services industries.  Natural extensions to this work would be 
to explore other types of information that influence customer selection in these industries. 
 Future research should explore other theoretical explanations for the supported 
three-way interaction of customer quantitative merit, customer reputation, and the 
decision-maker’s need for discretion on customer selection likelihood.  One conclusion 
from the results of the experimental study is that cue diagnosticity perspective alone does 
not explain individual differences in how cues are weighted in customer selection 
decisions.  Other models of information processing, including the dual-processing models 
(i.e., elaboration likelihood model, heuristic-systematic model) should be tested to 
determine which of these theories best explains the behavioral tendencies in customer 
selection decision-making.    
Future research should further establish the nomological validity of the NFD 
construct using the newly developed NFD scale to predict its antecedents and 
consequences.  Research should compare the job performance of low- and high-NFD 
individuals.  Work in this area should explore organizational, cultural, and environmental 
moderators to these relationships.  Consistent with research using the 3M model (e.g., 
Harris, Mowen, and Brown 2005; Licata, Mowen, Harris, and Brown 2003; Brown et al. 
2002), future work should explore the trait predictors of NFD and how it is related to 
other situational and surface-level traits of customer contact personnel (e.g., customer 
orientation, productivity orientation, job resourcefulness). 
 An important area of future research is to address the public policy implications 
of customer selection practices.  Recent enthusiasm surrounding customer relationship 
129
management raises the question of whether possible discrimination results as conscious 
effort is taken to avoid adverse customer selection.  Future work should consider the role 
of regulation and public policy in protecting the interests of all consumers of financial 
services, including small business owners.  Also, the competitive and economic 
consequences of different interpretations and enforcement of bank regulations should be 
explored further.  One possible question might address the impact of differences in the 
enforcement of regulations between smaller community banks and larger national or 
regional banks.  To the researcher’s knowledge these issues and research directions have 




In conclusion, this dissertation has shown, in a commercial lending context, that 
individual differences in the chronic need for discretion explains the behavioral tendency 
of high-need-for-discretion loan officers to weight more heavily customer reputation 
information, and low-need-for-discretion loan officers to rely more heavily on 
quantitative information when forming a customer selection decision– particularly in 
situations when evaluating customers with higher quantitative merit.  Customer risk 
assessment, attitude toward the customer, and the perceived value of the customer were 
shown to be strong predictors of customer selection likelihood.  A discussion of the 
managerial and policy implications of these results from the experimental study, and the 
findings from the in-depth interviews with bank executives, bank loan officers, and bank 
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NEED FOR DISCRETION – INITIAL SET OF ITEMS 
 
1. In my job I believe in doing things “by the rule book.” 
 
2. In my job I follow strict operational procedures at all times. 
 
3. I follow all the rules associated with my job. 
 
4. I never make exceptions to policies and procedures in my job. 
 
5. I pride myself on following rules and procedures with my job no matter 
what. 
 
6. I believe it is better to never step out of policy to make things happen in 
my job. 
 
7. I enforce policies and procedures in my job. 
 
8. Following policies and procedures is important to me. 
 






CASE SCENARIO:  LOW CUSTOMER QUANTITATIVE MERIT, 
NEGATIVE CUSTOMER REPUTATION 
 
Loan Decision-Making Exercise
Assume that as a commercial loan officer at your bank you have been given the loan profile of 
customer #222-4.  Imagine you have been given lending power to approve loans up to $250,000.  
You are responsible for collecting on each of the loans you give your customers.  Please 
carefully read the loan profile and answer the questions on the next two pages. 
 
Profile of Loan #222-4
This customer has come to you for a loan to purchase a warehouse to be used for their 
expanding business.  The total purchase price of the warehouse is $250,000.  The prospective 
borrower is willing to invest 15% of the borrower’s own cash toward the purchase of the 
warehouse and you have verified that in fact, these funds are available for this purchase.  
Therefore, the total requested loan amount is $212,500.   
 
You have been authorized by the customer to review his credit report from the credit bureau.  
After reviewing the credit report, you learn that this customer has a FICO score of 610. 
 
The cash flow of the customer’s business has rebounded from a negative trend over the two 
years previous to a positive trend over the last year.  The customer has consistently maintained 
average monthly deposit balances of $30,000.  
 
Since the loan amount is below $225,000, your bank’s policy does not require that an 
independent appraisal be performed on this property.  However, you are expected to have an 
informal appraisal of the real estate location and the overall condition of the warehouse to 
provide an assessment of the liquidity of the collateral in the case the bank has to foreclose and 
resell the property.  You have a colleague from your bank conduct an inspection of the 
warehouse and compare this warehouse to others in the market you serve.  Your colleague 
determines that the real estate location and overall condition of this warehouse is below average. 
 
The prospective borrower has been a customer of the bank for 10 years. The prospective 
borrower has refused to serve on the boards of many local charities.  There have been numerous 
reports of the borrower having serious disputes with his customers and employees.  The 




CASE SCENARIO:  LOW CUSTOMER QUANTITATIVE MERIT,  
POSITIVE CUSTOMER REPUTATION 
 
Loan Decision-Making Exercise
Assume that as a commercial loan officer at your bank you have been given the loan profile of 
customer #222-4.  Imagine you have been given lending power to approve loans up to $250,000.  
You are responsible for collecting on each of the loans you give your customers.  Please 
carefully read the loan profile and answer the questions on the next two pages. 
 
Profile of Loan #222-4
This customer has come to you for a loan to purchase a warehouse to be used for their 
expanding business.  The total purchase price of the warehouse is $250,000.  The prospective 
borrower is willing to invest 15% of the borrower’s own cash toward the purchase of the 
warehouse and you have verified that in fact, these funds are available for this purchase.  
Therefore, the total requested loan amount is $212,500.   
 
You have been authorized by the customer to review his credit report from the credit bureau.  
After reviewing the credit report, you learn that this customer has a FICO score of 610. 
 
The cash flow of the customer’s business has rebounded from a negative trend over the two 
years previous to a positive trend over the last year.  The customer has consistently maintained 
average monthly deposit balances of $30,000.  
 
Since the loan amount is below $225,000, your bank’s policy does not require that an 
independent appraisal be performed on this property.  However, you are expected to have an 
informal appraisal of the real estate location and the overall condition of the warehouse to 
provide an assessment of the liquidity of the collateral in the case the bank has to foreclose and 
resell the property.  You have a colleague from your bank conduct an inspection of the 
warehouse and compare this warehouse to others in the market you serve.  Your colleague 
determines that the real estate location and overall condition of this warehouse is below average. 
 
The prospective borrower has been a customer of the bank for 10 years. The prospective 
borrower serves on the boards of many local charities.  There have been no reports of the 
borrower having serious disputes with his customers and employees.  The prospective borrower 




CASE SCENARIO:  HIGH CUSTOMER QUANTITATIVE MERIT,  
NEGATIVE CUSTOMER REPUTATION 
 
Loan Decision-Making Exercise
Assume that as a commercial loan officer at your bank you have been given the loan profile of 
customer #222-4.  Imagine you have been given lending power to approve loans up to $250,000.  
You are responsible for collecting on each of the loans you give your customers.  Please 
carefully read the loan profile and answer the questions on the next two pages. 
 
Profile of Loan #222-4
This customer has come to you for a loan to purchase a warehouse to be used for their 
expanding business.  The total purchase price of the warehouse is $250,000.  The prospective 
borrower is willing to invest 15% of the borrower’s own cash toward the purchase of the 
warehouse and you have verified that in fact, these funds are available for this purchase.  
Therefore, the total requested loan amount is $212,500.   
 
You have been authorized by the customer to review his credit report from the credit bureau.  
After reviewing the credit report, you learn that this customer has a FICO score of 690. 
 
The cash flow of the customer’s business has rebounded from a negative trend over the two 
years previous to a positive trend over the last year.  The customer has consistently maintained 
average monthly deposit balances of $30,000.  
 
Since the loan amount is below $225,000, your bank’s policy does not require that an 
independent appraisal be performed on this property.  However, you are expected to have an 
informal appraisal of the real estate location and the overall condition of the warehouse to 
provide an assessment of the liquidity of the collateral in the case the bank has to foreclose and 
resell the property.  You have a colleague from your bank conduct an inspection of the 
warehouse and compare this warehouse to others in the market you serve.  Your colleague 
determines that the real estate location and overall condition of this warehouse is below average. 
 
The prospective borrower has been a customer of the bank for 10 years. The prospective 
borrower has refused to serve on the boards of many local charities.  There have been numerous 
reports of the borrower having serious disputes with his customers and employees.  The 




CASE SCENARIO:  HIGH CUSTOMER QUANTITATIVE MERIT,  
POSITIVE CUSTOMER REPUTATION 
 
Loan Decision-Making Exercise
Assume that as a commercial loan officer at your bank you have been given the loan profile of 
customer #222-4.  Imagine you have been given lending power to approve loans up to $250,000.  
You are responsible for collecting on each of the loans you give your customers.  Please 
carefully read the loan profile and answer the questions on the next two pages. 
 
Profile of Loan #222-4
This customer has come to you for a loan to purchase a warehouse to be used for their 
expanding business.  The total purchase price of the warehouse is $250,000.  The prospective 
borrower is willing to invest 15% of the borrower’s own cash toward the purchase of the 
warehouse and you have verified that in fact, these funds are available for this purchase.  
Therefore, the total requested loan amount is $212,500.   
 
You have been authorized by the customer to review his credit report from the credit bureau.  
After reviewing the credit report, you learn that this customer has a FICO score of 690. 
 
The cash flow of the customer’s business has rebounded from a negative trend over the two 
years previous to a positive trend over the last year.  The customer has consistently maintained 
average monthly deposit balances of $30,000.  
 
Since the loan amount is below $225,000, your bank’s policy does not require that an 
independent appraisal be performed on this property.  However, you are expected to have an 
informal appraisal of the real estate location and the overall condition of the warehouse to 
provide an assessment of the liquidity of the collateral in the case the bank has to foreclose and 
resell the property.  You have a colleague from your bank conduct an inspection of the 
warehouse and compare this warehouse to others in the market you serve.  Your colleague 
determines that the real estate location and overall condition of this warehouse is below average. 
 
The prospective borrower has been a customer of the bank for 10 years. The prospective 
borrower serves on the boards of many local charities.  There have been no reports of the 
borrower having serious disputes with his customers and employees.  The prospective borrower 








1) What are the personal, organizational, and environmental factors that influence the 
job performance of commercial loan officers? 
2) What are the factors that influence the degree to which a commercial loan officer 
employs “soft, qualitative” criteria (e.g., borrower’s reputation) as compared to 





This research would involve participation of all the commercial loan officers in the bank and the 
immediate supervisor to these loan officers.  A brief questionnaire – taking approximately 20 
minutes to complete – would be distributed to the commercial loan officers.  A separate 
questionnaire would be given to the immediate supervisor of the commercial loan officers.  The 
employee questionnaire would include a variety of measures designed to understand factors that 
motivate performance and the evaluation of loan officers.  The questionnaire given to the 
immediate supervisor will include a few brief measures of the organization and the industry 
environment.  The immediate supervisor(s) will also be asked to assess the performance of each 
of their loan officers responding to a few brief questions (i.e., 1 minute per loan officer 




Research Team Commitments: 
 Provision of a written summary of the factors that influence commercial loan officer 
success based on the findings from the survey. Professor Mowen has performed 
numerous studies on the characteristics of successful customer contact personnel, 
including bank officers. 
 Presentation of findings if desired by senior management. 
 
Corporate Participation: 
 Permit access to commercial loan officers (and all others that do commercial lending) and 
their supervisor to complete 20-minute surveys. 
 Provide information, if available, regarding the objective performance of each of the loan 
officers (e.g., portfolio growth, net charge offs, fee income generated, loan exceptions, 
etc.). 
 Help facilitate the distribution of a survey by: providing a roster of the loan officers and 
supervisor, and transmitting an email memo from a top executive prior to survey 
distribution to endorse the project and to request participation (note: a sample memo will 
be provided by the research team). 
 
We would like to stress that all responses will be kept confidential. To ensure confidentiality, an 
outside researcher will collect all questionnaires directly.  A summary of findings (and if desired 
a presentation of the findings) will be provided to the senior manager.  All names will be removed 
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prior to the report of findings.  All funding for this project is provided entirely by the Department 




Primary Contact: Sterling A. Bone, Doctoral Candidate 
Spears School of Business, Oklahoma State University 
Phone: 405-744-3201; Email: sterling.bone@okstate.edu 
 
Supervisor:  John C. Mowen, Regents Professor and Noble Chair of Marketing 
Strategy 
 Spears School of Business, Oklahoma State University 






December 9, 2005 
 
TO: Commercial Loan Officers and Commercial Loan Officer Supervisors 
FROM:     Name   , CEO 
RE: Request for Participation in Research Study 
 
The management would like to invite you to participate in a research study directed by 
Sterling A. Bone and John C. Mowen at Oklahoma State University’s Spears School of 
Business.  The focus of this research is to investigate the motivation and performance of 
bank loan officers.  This research is being conducted in partial fulfillment of Mr. Bone’s 
PhD degree in marketing. 
 
Your participation involves taking 20 minutes to answer questions on a survey that will 
be delivered to you during the week of December 12th, and then mailing the completed 
survey by December 19th. For taking the time to answer and return the completed survey, 
a $2.00 donation will be made by the researchers to the hurricane recovery efforts of 
Habitat for Humanity.  Additionally, you will have the option to request a summary of 
the survey findings to be sent to you. 
 
I personally would like to encourage you to participate in this study.  Not only will this 
assist Mr. Bone in completing the requirements of his doctorate degree, it will also assist 
our bank in improving the quality of the service we offer our customers and enhancing 
the working conditions of our loan officers.  
 
If you have any questions or would like additional information, please contact Sterling A. 
Bone at 405-744-3201 (e-mail: sterling.bone@okstate.edu). 
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Scope and Method of Study:  This research investigated factors that influence customer 
selection decisions.  Two methods were employed.  First, interviews were conducted 
with bank executives, loan officers, and regulators to identify factors that influence 
customer selection decisions in retail bank lending.  Second, an experiment was 
conducted with 262 commercial loan officers to test a three-way interaction between 
customer quantitative merit, customer reputation, and the decision-maker’s need for 
discretion (NFD) on the behavioral intentions to accept or reject a customer’s 
business (i.e., customer selection likelihood).   
 
Finding and Conclusions:  ANOVA results supported the three-way interaction.  The 
interaction pattern, however, differed from the prediction derived from cue 
diagnosticity theory.  For low-NFD individuals, the prediction that customer 
quantitative merit would be the dominant information cue was supported.  For high-
NFD individuals, the prediction was that customer reputation would be dominant 
when reputation was positive. When negative, however, quantitative merit would be 
diagnostic.  The results revealed an opposite effect.  That is, when reputation was 
negative, there was no main effect for quantitative merit; however, when reputation 
was positive, there was a main effect.  Additional analyses revealed that NFD did not 
influence the use of reputation information when quantitative merit (i.e., credit score) 
was low.  A “floor effect” for quantitative merit was proposed as an explanation.  
When quantitative merit was high, however, NFD influenced the extent to which 
reputation information affected customer selection likelihood.  That is, when 
quantitative merit was high, NFD moderated the impact of customer reputation, such 
that customer reputation information influenced high-NFD individuals but not low-
NFD individuals.  This research will assist managers in understanding how their 
customer contact personnel interpret information cues to make selection decisions.  
Policy implications were discussed regarding the potential for customer 
discrimination. 
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